Falsifiable predictions of evolutionary theory

Philosophy of Science 40 (4):518-537 (1973)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have asserted that evolutionary theory is unfalsifiable. In this paper I refute these assertions by detailing some falsifiable predictions of the theory and the evidence used to test them. I then analyze both these predictions and evidence cited to support assertions of unfalsifiability in order to show both what type of predictions are possible and why it has been so difficult to spot them. The conclusion is that the apparent logical peculiarity of evolutionary theory is not a property of evolutionary theory; it is a property of our human-sized perspective on evolutionary theory

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Citations of this work

The propensity interpretation of fitness.Susan K. Mills & John H. Beatty - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (2):263-286.
Adaptation and Evolutionary Theory.Robert N. Brandon - 1978 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 9 (3):181.
Systematizing the theoretical virtues.Michael Keas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2761-2793.
Pure science and the problem of progress.Heather Douglas - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:55-63.

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References found in this work

Philosophy and Scientific Realism.J. J. C. Smart - 1965\ - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (60):358-360.
The Concept of Evolution.A. R. Manser - 1965 - Philosophy 40 (151):18 - 34.

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