Abstract

In this paper I address the claim that it is morally wrong to seek the elimination of certain human kinds characterized by disability by preventing the representative members of the relevant kinds from existing. I argue that there are compelling reasons to take a qualified interpretation of this claim seriously. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to endorse one consideration that illustrates a morally problematic feature of seeking to eliminate human kinds. I defend the claim that it is morally wrong to reduce the diversity of humans who recognize each other as agents deserving of equal respect and moral standing. I do not argue that this is the most important factor to consider when addressing the possibility of eliminating human kinds; I claim only that it deserves more serious consideration than it has so far received in the existing literature. This ‘diversity argument’ ought to affect the debate concerning the permissibility of eliminating human kinds that are characterized by disability in two ways: (a) it generates a prima facie obligation to preserve human kinds that ought to affect the way the concerns of disability activists are balanced against our obligation to prevent harm to future persons, and (b) the argument ought to change the polarized tone of the current debate by providing a broadly convincing reason to oppose the elimination of human kinds that shows distinct respect for the unique perspective of disabled persons and the value of their contribution to the moral community.