What makes an explanation

Philosophy of Science 31 (3):241-254 (1964)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Newtonian theory has usually been accepted as a paradigm example of an explanation. There are two widely known analyses of what makes it so. According to one analysis, the deductive and predictive nature of the theory is what counts. The second analysis emphasizes the ability of the theory to connect widely different events and laws. The present paper proposes a third analysis stressing three characteristics. (1) The explanation includes a description which is in part of something unobserved. (2) The description is true in the sense of corresponding to the facts. (3) Through the description, the explanation confers "naturalness" upon the thing explained

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Nomic Subsumptive Explanation.Susan Mary Sack - 1980 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
Reintroducing prediction to explanation.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (4):444-463.
What Should We Expect of a Theory of Explanation?Barbara V. E. Klein - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:319 - 328.
What Makes a Scientific Theory Probably True.Richard Swinburne - 2010 - In Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 203--212.
On the logical conditions of deductive explanation.Jaegwon Kim - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (3):286-291.
Action and Agent.Kurt Baier - 1965 - The Monist 49 (2):183-195.
Explaining Explanation. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 46 (1):178-179.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
258 (#82,006)

6 months
19 (#144,815)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references