Gestalt Switching: Hanson, Aronson, and Harre

Philosophy of Science 59 (3):480-86 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This discussion takes up an attack by Jerrold Aronson (seconded by Rom Harre) on the use made by Norwood R. Hanson of the Gestalt-Switch Analogy in the philosophy of science. Aronson's understanding of what is implied in a gestalt switch is shown to be flawed. In his endeavor to detach conceptual understanding from perceptual identification he cites several examples, without realizing the degree to which such gestalt switches can affect conceptualizing or how conceptualizing can affect gestalts. In particular, he has not confronted the possibility of such gestalt selection being involved in the basic identification of what we term "entities"

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,479

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
41 (#287,382)

6 months
1 (#455,463)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
On Singling out an object determinately.David Wiggins - 1986 - In P. Pettit & J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Clarendon Press.
New representationalism.Edmond Wright - 1990 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20 (1):65-92.
The Entity Fallacy in Epistemology.Edmond Wright - 1992 - Philosophy 67 (259):33 - 50.

Add more references