How can the philosopher use history of science to assess normative methodologies? This paper distinguishes the "intuitionist" meta-methodologies from the "rationability" meta-methodology. The rationability approach is defended by showing that it does not lead to anarchistic conclusions drawn by Feyerabend, Lakatos, and Kuhn; rather, these conclusions are the result of auxiliary assumptions about the nature of rational norms. By freeing the rationability meta-method from these assumptions, the specter of anarchism can be exorcised from it.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,508
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Methodologies, Not Method, for Primate Theory of Mind.H. Lyn Miles & Warren P. Roberts - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):126-127.
Is Meta-Analysis the Platinum Standard of Evidence?Jacob Stegenga - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):497-507.
Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference.Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
Robinson Crusoe, Wittgenstein, and the Return to Society.Ron Ben-Tovim - 2008 - Philosophy and Literature 32 (2):pp. 278-292.
History and the Norms of Science.James Robert Brown - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:236 - 248.


Added to PP index

Total views
47 ( #199,075 of 2,330,893 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #256,394 of 2,330,893 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes