Unfeigning the delusion: Antinatalism and the end of suffering

Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12871 (2022)
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Abstract

In this article I explore the antinatalist view according to which it would be better if humans were to stop reproducing in order to contribute to the non-violent and voluntary extinction of the species as a whole. Not only is reproduction morally problematic in an already vastly overpopulated world, it is held that the human predicament can only be solved by slowly, but surely removing human presence altogether. Radical as this might sound, it must be noted that, far from a villainous distaste of human life and happiness, this view emerges from a careful consideration of the vicissitudes of ordinary human existence. In spite of innumerous earlier attempts, suffering cannot be blotted out in life. What is called for, then, is something more conclusive: we can only remove suffering when we get rid of that which suffers. Any other attempt at solving the human predicament ultimately represents a merely cosmetic approach to problem-solving and the eradication of suffering.

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