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  1. How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. E. Schwitzgebel & M. S. Gordon - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 28:235-246.
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  2. How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. E. Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual (...)
     
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  3. Little or No Experience Outside of Attention?Hurlburt Russell & E. Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):234-252.
     
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  4. Methodological Pluralism, Armchair Introspection, and DES as the Epistemic Tribunal.Hurlburt Russell & E. Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):253-273.
     
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  5. Presuppositions and Background Assumptions.Hurlburt Russell & E. Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):206-233.
     
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