Can a virtuous person act contrary to the virtue she possesses? Can virtues have “holes”—or blindspots—and nonetheless count as virtues? Gopal Sreenivasan defends a notion of a blindspot that is, in my view, an unstable moral category. I will argue that no trait possessing such a “hole” can qualify as a virtue. My strategy for showing this appeals to the importance of motivation to virtue, a feature of virtue to which Sreenivasan does not adequately attend. Sreenivasan’s account allows performance alone (...) to be a reliable indicator of the possession of virtue. I argue that, at least with respect to a classical, Aristotelian conception of virtue, this assumption is mistaken: a person is said to possess a virtue only when she is properly motivated. In my view, the nature of motivation required for the possession of Aristotelian virtue does not admit of blindspots. I am not primarily interested in details about the situationist critique of virtue theory but rather the implications that blindspots have for our conception of virtue. I argue that because the practical reasoning of the virtuous requires both cognitive and motivational coherence, the motivational structure of the virtuous agent cannot accommodate blindspots. My conclusion is neither a defense of motivational internalism nor of an idealized conception of Aristotelian virtue. My aim is to show that because blindspotted virtue does not cohere well with Aristotle’s conception of virtuous agency, friends of virtue theory must choose one or the other; they cannot have both. (shrink)
Hume claims that moral assessments refer to character; it is character of which we morally approve and disapprove. This essay explores what Hume means by “character.” Is it true that moral assessments refer to character, and should Hume think this given his other commitments in moral philosophy and moral psychology? I discuss two prominent themes—namely, Hume’s views on moral responsibility; and Hume’s comparison of moral feelings with feelings of love—to see what light these themes can shed on Hume’s broader views (...) about moral assessment. I argue that at least according to a traditional understanding of the term, character could not plausibly have a role to play in Hume’s account of moral assessment, but that Hume’s moral theory could require a conception of character different from this traditional one: a conception according to which character need not be the standard one that holds character to be consistent, stable, and well-integrated. In morally assessing others, we do not do so on the basis of their characters , but on the basis of their motivational states. My account of Hume’s theory of the responsibility, passions and the moral sentiments leaves intact the central Humean insights about the conditions for action and the arousal of the moral sentiment, suggesting what Hume could have said, both more plausibly and without undermining the key features of his moral psychology. And it also shows that Hume’s moral theory has no need for a robust conception of character. (shrink)
Do people have character traits? What is happiness? These two questions seem at best loosely related to each other, but The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, edited by Nancy E. Snow and Franco V. Trivigno does a formidable job at showing how intimately connected they are, and how fruitful it can be to bring the concepts and theories developed in debates about the former to bear on issues concerning the latter, and vice versa.The present volume brings together (...) some of the world’s leading experts on situationism, virtue, and well-being. It gives both an enlightening overview of the current state of research about those topics, as well as detailed discussions of more particular issues. The book contains 14 original articles , which are divided into four parts: Persons, Situation, and Virtue , The Moral Psychology of Virtue , Asian Philosophy and Psychology on Virtue and Happiness , and Happiness (4 .. (shrink)
O artigo apresenta os argumentos centrais da política deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas (1), e as perspectivas críticas de Axel Honneth (2) e Nancy Fraser (3) de forma a conferir à política habermasiana uma dimensão mais realista, um conteúdo político de vínculo mais concreto com a orientação emancipatória da práxis, e capaz de lidar melhor com a diferença, a diversidade e o conflito.
As teorias feministas de gênero passaram nas ultimas décadas de uma concepção pós-marxistas a partir dos novos estudos de cultura e identidade, baseando-se no movimento de redistribuição, para o de reconhecimento. Este artigo mostra esse processo de mudança de paradigma. Nele não se procura uma análise de gênero ampla o bastante para abrigar todas as variedades das preocupações feministas. Mostra a concepção de justiça de Nancy Fraser que abrange tanto a redistribuição quanto o reconhecimento, pois reparar a injustiça certamente (...) requer uma política de reconhecimento. Traz a ideia de Reconhecimento de Axel Honneth que estabelece os padrões de reconhecimento inter-sugestivo: o amor (que gera autoconfiança – amizade, relações no trabalho), o direito (auto-respeito) e a solidariedade (auto-estima - reconhecimento, interação social). Conclui-se com uma tentativa de conceitos de redistribuição e reconhecimento de Fraser e Honneth para contribuir na correção da má redistribuição ou o não reconhecimento de gênero. (shrink)
Este artigo pretende investigar algumas dimensões da filosofia de Jacques Derrida e Jean-Luc Nancy em relação aos temas do niilismo, da ética e da política. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Niilismo. Ética. Filosofia política. Filosofia francesa.
En el presente texto analizaremos la categoría de pluralidad como componente indispensable para pensar en la construcción de una comunidad no totalitaria y como impedimento a ciertos modos contemporáneos de dejar fuera-de una comunidad a determinados grupos humanos. La cuestión de fondo, que no pretendemos resolver aquí, es la posibilidad de pensar un mundo en donde quepan muchos mundos. Propondremos la categoría de pluralidad para abordar esta cuestión tanto a partir del análisis realizado por Hannah Arendt, como por Jean-Luc (...) class='Hi'>Nancy. En un primer momento nos detendremos en la figura de la exclusión del mundo a partir de las nociones de apátrida trabajada por Arendt, necropolítica por el filósofo camerunés Achille Mbembe y la idea de inmundicia elaborada por Nancy. Desde allí podremos tomar la perspectiva que buscamos para el análisis de la pluralidad, donde plantearemos, por una parte las infranqueables diferencias e incompatibilidades entre el análisis arendtiano y nancyano de la pluralidad como proponer algunas confluencias. Finalmente propondremos la exigencia de un momento de autoafirmación y vinculación de la pluralidad que es lo que hace que esta pueda constituir un mundo y muchos mundos a la vez, este momento es el nosotros, trabajado también por Arendt, Nancy y Roig. In the following text we will analyse the category of plurality as an essential element to think of the construction of a nontotalitarian community and as an impediment to particular contemporary modes of leaving certain specific human groups “out of” a community. The bottom line, which we do not intend to solve here, is the possibility to think a world in which many worlds fit. We will propose the category of plurality to approach this issue both from the analysis carried out by both Hannah Arendt and by Jean-Luc Nancy. At first we will consider the representation of exclusion from the world starting from the notions of stateless developed by Arendt, necropolitics by Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe, and the idea of filth by Nancy. From there we can take the perspective that we seek for the analysis of plurality, posing on the one hand the insurmountable differences and incompatibilities between Arendt’s and Nancy’s analysis of plurality, and, on the other hand, some of their confluences. Finally, we will propose the necessity of a moment of self-assertion and connection of plurality that permits the constitution of this plurality as one and many worlds at the same time this moment is “us”, addressed also by Arendt, Nancy and Roig. (shrink)
_Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory_ takes on the claims of philosophical situationism, the ethical theory that is skeptical about the possibility of human virtue. Influenced by social psychological studies, philosophical situationists argue that human personality is too fluid and fragmented to support a stable set of virtues. They claim that virtue cannot be grounded in empirical psychology. This book argues otherwise. Drawing on the work of psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, Nancy E. Snow argues that (...) the social psychological experiments that philosophical situationists rely on look at the wrong kinds of situations to test for behavioral consistency. Rather than looking at situations that are objectively similar, researchers need to compare situations that have similar meanings _for the subject_. When this is done, subjects exhibit behavioral consistencies that warrant the attribution of enduring traits, and virtues are a subset of these traits. Virtue can therefore be empirically grounded and virtue ethics has nothing to fear from philosophical situationism. (shrink)