O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a interpretação pragmatista da tradição da Teoria Crítica, e o papel que as idealizações neokantianas assumem nesta interpretação. Tentaremos mostrar que, em uma interpretação pragmatista, o cerne da Teoria Crítica consiste em uma tensão argumentativa vinculada à estruturação comunicativo-discursiva típica das sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, como estruturação que confere às discussões práticas um papel primordial na dinâmica social concreta. Partindo de uma análise das diferenças entre as perspectivas antiga e moderna de compreensão da discussão prática, (...) procuramos mostrar que, no âmbito das discussões práticas modernas ou contemporâneas, as idealizações neokantianas assumem um papel central, definido através da oposição a fatores objetivos ou objetivados, alheios à racionalidade, que admitidamente afetam tais discussões. Nesse contexto, as idealizações neokantianas se configuram como suposições idealizadoras, com as quais os participantes das discussões não podem deixar de em alguma medida se comprometer. AbstractThe aim of this paper is to analyze the pragmatist interpretation of Critical Theory, and the role that the neo-kantians idealizations assume in this interpretation. We argue that, in the pragmatist interpretation, the core of Critical Theory is located in an argumentative tension linked to the communicative and discursive structuring typical of the contemporary democratic societies, as a structuring which gives to the practical discussions a primordial role in the concrete dynamics of society. Starting from an analysis of the differences between the ancient and the modern perspectives of comprehension of practical discussion, we argue that, in the context of the modern or contemporary practical discussions, the neo-kantians idealizations assume a key role, defined by the opposition to objective or objectified elements, which are alien to rationality, and affect such discussions. In this context, the neo-kantians idealizations take the figure of idealizing suppositions, with which the participants cannot help engaging. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge relies heavily on models, shaped by simplifying assumptions, with common categories being abstraction and idealization. This article aims to expose conceptual challenges inherent in conventional interpretations of these concepts, particularly in their practical application to scientific modeling. The primary hurdle emerges in applying these categories to real­world instances of scientific modeling, which we illustrate with examples of non­causal explanations. Key issues revolve around (i) the ambiguous distinction between abstraction and idealization and (ii) the application of the simplifying assumption (...) of abstraction. Our hypothesis posits that non­causal explanations face unintelligibility due to an unclear understanding of the role of simplifying assumptions in them. To test this, we analyze selected examples, ranging from (toy­)examples to real­world instances, scrutinizing the alignment with the standard notions of abstraction and idealization. Throughout, we investigate the influence of simplifying assumptions on these explanations, assessing their adherence or deviation from conventional concepts. (shrink)

Many scientific disciplines rely on the construction and use of models: biomedical sciences are no exception. This PhD thesis addresses several aspects of the practice of scientific modeling. First, I discuss the nature of modeling as such, proposing a novel, complementary account of scientific modeling which I term the experimentation-driven modeling account and which drives the construction of mechanistic models in many fields of biological and biomedical research, such as cancer immunology. Second, I scrutinize an objection to the mechanistic account (...) of explanation according to which the account fails to accommodate the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors. I argue that this objection ultimately fails because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. Third, I analyze the roles of similarity judgments in some fields of cancer research which employ a variety of mouse models to learn about the disease mechanisms, arguing that by appreciating the epistemic complexities it is possible to shed new light on more general philosophical debates regarding scientific representation. Fourth, mechanisms can also be studied using more theoretical apparatus in the form of simulations. I investigate an example of an agent-based model used to model the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2... (shrink)