The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 10 September 2009 which repealed the proclaimed early elections to the Chamber of Deputies because of their alleged unconstitutionality fully manifests unjustifiability of the interference by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The decision directly interfered with the process of democratic re-establishment of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the Court´s intervention was only made possible by violating a number of constitutionally prescribed rules. Finally, the respective ruling could not be (...) issued without a “creative approach” on the part of the Constitutional Court towards the rules governing procedures before the Court. The approach eventually resulted in the violation of principles of fair trial – before a body that should guarantee them. The paper analyses in detail various individual aspects of the case, from general issues of the division of power and contents of the mandate of deputies to individual procedural stages before the Constitutional Court. (shrink)

Under Article 63 of the Constitution, a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is one of the grounds for discontinuation of the powers of the Member of the Seimas. The Constitution does not reveal expressis verbis as to what is a gross violation of the law on election. The establishment of this is within the discretion of the legislator. While defining what a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is, the legislator is (...) bound by the norms and principles of the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not define expressis verbis as to what a gross violation of the law on election is, the fact that, under Item 6 of Article 63 of the Constitution, the powers of a Member of the Seimas shall cease on this ground, implies at least several things: first, not every violation of the law on election can be regarded as a gross one, thus, if the law on election has not been grossly violated, it is not permitted on this ground to recognise that the Member of the Seimas lost his mandate, or that the powers of the Member of the Seimas ceased; second, only such violations may be regarded as gross ones, upon commission of which there appear reasonable doubts whether during the election the genuine will of the voters was expressed, whether their will was not distorted to the extent that the results of the election do not reflect the genuine will of the voters and the mandates of Members of the Seimas have been distributed unfairly. (shrink)

The Czech Republic today belongs to the minority of European republics whose presidents are elected indirectly. It is a paradox that, even when direct election of the President has stable support not only of the majority of Czech society but also of the majority of parliamentary parties, this issue is constantly only discussed. Should direct election gain passage in the Czech Republic, there are formally better preconditions for this than there were in the past. With regard to the fact that (...) a change in the manner of the election of the Head of State hides in itself the potential to impact the functioning of the whole constitutional system, it is worth it to follow how this problem conceived in the Czech Republic. This article is devoted to the standing of the President of the Republic in the contemporary Czech constitutional system and to considerations about direct election from the year 1918 to the present. Attention is also devoted to the difficulties which it is necessary to come to terms with during a potential change in the manner of the election of the President if the current balance of powers between the constitutional organs is to remain preserved. (shrink)