One of the prevalent inference methods the mutakallimūn uses is qiyās al-ghaib ‘ala al-shahid (analogy from the visible world to the invisible world). Mu‘tazila, who accepts this method as an absolute criterion in the divine attributes, rejects the possibility of difference between shahid and ghaib about the reality of attributes. By rejecting the concept of kalām nafsī adopted by Ahl al-Sunnah, they mention the divine speech in the category of actual attributes and claim that kalāmullāh (God’s speech), like human speech, (...) is an accident consisting of words and sounds. Mu‘tazila, who defines mutakallim as the agent of kalām, claims that God is also the agent of the word. In this regard, Mu‘tazila, who defends the origin of the kalāmullāh and the createdness of the Qur’ān, focuses on the explanation of the nature of the kalām at the beginning of these theological subjects. As an extension of the issue of whether the ḥikāyah and maḥkī are the same or not, which is the subject of discussion in the context of the possibility of creating something similar to the Qur’ān, Mu‘tazila, who disagree on whether kalām (word) is a kind of sound (ṣawt) or not, examine the problem of the nature of the word by expanding it to include sounds. Although they agree that sounds are accidents created by humans through tawlīd, they propound different theories about the physical formation of sound and kalām. These theories are differentiated according to discussions about the essential factors for the formation of sounds. Some scholars claim that i‘timād generates sounds, and the substrate (maḥall) is enough to form the sounds. In contrast, others claim the necessity of a specific structure (binya), movement (ḥaraka), and air added to the substrate. In this regard, this study will deal with the effect of these factors mentioned above to the formation of the sounds and the physical examples which every group mentioned to prove its opinions rightfulness. The most detailed explanations about this topic are seen in the works of Baṣrian Mu‘tazila. Therefore, this study will examine the opinions about the production of sounds, which argued around metaphysical issues in the context of the createdness of the Qur’ān and the attribute of kalām, which are submitted by Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/916), Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 321/933), and their followers Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. first half of the 5./11. century), and Ibn Mattawayh (d. first half of the 5./11. century), the representatives of Baṣrian Mu‘tazila, who adopt atomic universe understanding. The study aimed to form an opinion about the theologians’ way of discussing a particular physical phenomenon to constitute a basis for solving metaphysical problems. To clarify the problem, first, it will deal with the essence of sounds in the Baṣrian Mu‘tazilites tradition, and then it will tackle the discussions about the formation of the sounds. (shrink)

The problem of human freedom have been addressed by al-Mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians) in the context of human acts and discussed from the point of view its relation with the will and other elements. At this point, whether the human has will and power in his own act, the limits of his will and power, the role of human in the act and his responsibilities have prompted to different debates. The theory of tawlīd put forward by Mu‘tazila is very crucial in (...) terms of determining the scope and limits of the freedom of human in acts. Mu‘tazila’s tawlīd theory defenses based on two important reasons. The first is to present the nature and limits of the acts that man did them outside himself. The other is to explain the relationship of human with such acts with regards to moral responsibility. Because both issues are very important in the principle of justice of Mu‘tazila. The effort to put the cause-effect relationship of human with his acts in terms of tawhīd and justice on the rational and moral ground is the reason for emergence of the theory. In this respect, the purpose of this theory which enables establishing a causality relationship between the human act and nature is aimed at the justification of freedom and responsibility between agent (fā‘il) and act.In this study, firstly, the definition of the concept of tawlīd and its meaning area have been presented and tackled the discussions about the agent of indirect acts. And then it has been discoursed upon the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunna about the subject of tawlīd. The subject has been outlined in the context of the intellectual discussion between Ahl al-Sunna and Mu‘tazila which constitute the dominant part of theological dispute tradition. In this respect, the main purpose of the study is to reveal how the limits of indirect actions belonging to human by force of freedom and moral responsibility are drawn and understood.Although they did not have a uniform thought about the topic, Mu‘tazila theologians who accepted semi-determinism in the theory of tawlīd acknowledged the existence of natures in the substances. Those who admitted the reason as a means of the act did not approve this. By accepting the continuity of the accidents in the acts, they twisted together the voluntary acts and the natural acts, and accepted that directly acts were realized through the human will and the other according to the principle of necessity. According to Mu‘tazila, causes are only means. Hence, the act emerging as a result of the means is the act of the agent who used this means to reach the result, not the means. Therefore, man is the agent of engendered acts and responsible for all kinds of acts that arise as a reflection of the will and their consequences. While Ahl al-Sunna has directly associated the action of man and all its consequences with the power of Allah, Mu‘tazila has based these actions on the power of man, which Allah has created in man and has been the source of the acts. Contrary to Mu‘tazila, the continuance of power which are not a constant accident is not possible for a second act from the point of Ahl al-Sunna since they have accepted the idea that the accidents will not be continuous. In this respect, according to Ahl al-Sunna, there is no compulsory relationship between the agent that caused the formation of the acts and the result supervening from them. They did not accept the idea of tawlīd, which its meaning is that accident gives birth to accident, because it would oblige the relationship between cause and effect. Because this relationship, which Mu‘tazila gives the name of tawlīd in human acts, is made up for that Allah has created His laws right after the orientation of human to the cause. In this respect, Ahl al-Sunna thinkers rejected tawlīd because it would mean attributing an act to an inanimate being and require a mandatory relationship between cause and effect in the functioning of the universe. Although the result does not occur with his own act when the person applies to the cause, he is responsible for his act because it is related to the person who did it. Māturīdī tradition did not accept the acts that emerged as a result of tawlīd as the production of man, but they tried to establish a balance by holding the person responsible because he is the reason for the outcome that emerged. As for the Ash‘arites, they avoided giving a real effect of the will and power to the causes by considering that created will and power is only a locus in the emergence of the act. The person has no effect on his act except for directing his will to that act and his behavior which will make the person responsible is based on this will. (shrink)