Ruder Josip Boscovich, a philosopher, mathematician, physicist and astronomer. The greatest of the forgotten—as Barrow says. The author of the Theory of Everything, based on the presumption that the whole substance of this world is reducible to simple, homogeneous, discontinuous and invariable physical points. These points being the centers of forces of repulsion and attraction. His system of kinematic atomism constitutes a crucial stage in the development of physics and philosophy. The physical points combine both material and psychological features, therefore (...) among commentators the prevailing view is that they possess rather a quasi-material nature. The following presentation, however, emphasizes their psychological aspect, especially in the light of Boscovich's fairly original attempt to reduce mental states and physical facts to one, common definition. This reduction is based on the presumption that the rules which govern both kinds of substance can be reduced to the one Rule of All Forces. Hence, this rule concerns everything in the Universe. (shrink)

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes (...) on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes' doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity. (shrink)

Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...) propose two solutions to this problem, both of which yield a hint regarding what act Spinoza has in mind. Using that hint, I propose that we can appreciate Spinoza’s insight by considering how philosophizing about a feeling can 'kill the mood.' The act of grasping how a passion exemplifies certain general truths, I hold, is a distinctly rational activity that has all the features Spinoza describes. I conclude by showing how this interpretation fits with Spinoza’s larger views on rational knowledge, rational joy, the comprehensibility of passions, and the relation between second- and first-order ideas. (shrink)