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  1. Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
    This article examines the intersection of the theory of extended mind/cognition and theory of knowledge. In the minds of some, it matters to conditions for knowing whether the mind extends beyond the boundaries of body and brain. I examine these intuitions and find no support for this view from tracking theories of knowledge. I then argue that the apparent difference extended mind is supposed to have for ability or credit theories is also illusory.
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  2. Patrick Allo (2008). Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):427-432.
    As Vincent Hendricks remarks early on in this book, the formal and mainstream traditions of epistemic theorising have mostly evolved independently of each other. This initial impression is confirmed by a comparison of the main problems and methods practitioners in each tradition are concerned with. Mainstream epistemol- ogy engages in a dialectical game of proposing and challenging definitions of knowledge. Formal epistemologists proceed differently, as they design a wide variety of axiomatic and model-theoretic methods whose consequences they investigate independently of (...)
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  3. William Alston (1978). ``Meta-Ethics and Meta-Epistemology&Quot. In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel 275-97.
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  4. William P. Alston (2001). Doing Epistemology Without Justification. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):1-18.
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  5. William P. Alston (1989). A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press 1--29.
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  6. Carlos Arboleda Mora & Carlos Restrepo (2013). El giro teológico. Nuevos caminos de la filosofía. Escritos 21 (46):278-281.
    Este escrito reconstruye las razones y figuras tanto filosóficas como teológicas que originaron el “giro teológico” de la fenomenología. Un punto importante lo constituye la influencia de Dionisio Areopagita en el pensamiento de Heidegger, no siempre reconocida como sí ocurre, en cambio, con la presencia de Eckhart. Esta génesis implica la recepción cristiana del neoplatonismo, que compone la llamada “teología negativa”. Bajo esta clave de lectura, el “giro teológico” apunta a ampliar los límites de la razón para superar la razón (...)
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  7. Luís M. Augusto (2011). Putting the horse before the cart: A pragmatist analysis of knowledge. Trans/Form/Ação 34 (2):135-152.
    The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that (...)
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  8. Luis M. Augusto (2005). Who's Afraid of Idealism? University Press of America.
    In Who's Afraid of Idealism? the philosophical concept of idealism, the extent to which reality is mind-made, is examined in new light. Author Luis M. Augusto explores epistemological idealism, at the source of all other kinds of idealism, from the viewpoints of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche, two philosophers who spent a large part of their lives denigrating the very concept. Working from Kant and Nietzsche's viewpoints that idealism was a scandal to philosophy and the cause of nihilism, Augusto evaluates (...)
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  9. Kent Bach (2008). Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.
    This paper offers a smattering of applications of pragmatics to epistemology. In most cases they concern recent epistemological claims that depend for their plausibility on mistaking something pragmatic for something semantic. After giving my formulation of the semantic/pragmatic distinction and explaining how seemingly semantic intuitions can be responsive to pragmatic factors, I take up the following topics: 1. Classic Examples of Confusing Meaning and Use 2. Pragmatic Implications of Hedging or Intensifying an Assertion 3. Belief Attributions 4. Knowledge-wh 5. The (...)
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  10. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1997). The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
    The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...)
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  12. Peter Baumann (forthcoming). Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Dialogue.
    The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but is so (...)
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  13. Peter Baumann (2008). Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism. Erkenntnis 69 (2):189-200.
    One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too relaxed concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation.
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  14. John Bengson (2013). Knowledge How Vs. Knowledge That. In B. Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage
    An overview of philosophical work on the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that, focusing on what it means to say that they are 'distinct', and on what is at stake in the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge how.
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  15. Donato Bergandi (2007). Niveaux d'Organisations : Évolution, Écologie Et Transaction. In Thierry Martin (ed.), Le tout et les parties dans les systèmes naturels. Vuibert 47-55.
  16. Hari Mohan Bhattacharyya (1994). Jaina Logic and Epistemology. K.P. Bagchi & Co..
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  17. Tim Black (2008). Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism. In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan 8--27.
    I defend a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism, an epistemological account with the following characteristic features: (a) it reserves a place for a sensitivity condition on knowledge, according to which, very roughly, S’s belief that p counts as knowledge only if S wouldn’t believe that p if p were false; (b) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are comparatively low; and (c) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are invariant (i.e., that they vary neither with the linguistic context of the (...)
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  18. Margaret A. Boden (1990). Interdisciplinary Epistemology. Synthese 85 (2):185 - 197.
    In commemorating Piaget we should not remember his psychology alone. He hoped for a biologically grounded epistemology, which would require interdisciplinary effort. This paper mentions some recent research in biology, embryology, and philosophy that is consonant with Piaget's epistemological aims. The authors do not cite Piaget as a prime intellectual influence, there being no distinctive Piagetian methodology outside psychology. But they each mention him as someone whose work is relevant to theirs and whose interdisciplinary aims will be achieved only if (...)
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  19. Georg Brun (2012). Rival Logics, Disagreement and Reflective Equilibrium. In C. Jaeger W. Loeffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium). 355-368.
    Two challenges to the method of reflective equilibrium have been developed in a dispute between Michael D. Resnik and Stewart Shapiro: because the method itself involves logical notions, it can neither be specified in a logic-neutral way nor can it allow logical pluralism. To analyse and answer these claims, an explicit distinction is introduced between judgements held prior to the process of mutual adjustments and judgements in agreement with the systematic principles, which result from the process. It is then argued (...)
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  20. Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
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  21. Andrei A. Buckareff (2008). Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology. Dialogue 47 (3-4):425-.
    In their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the "replacement thesis"--proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and (...)
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  22. Richmond Campbell (2008). How Ecological Should Epistemology Be? Hypatia 23 (1):161-169.
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  23. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Active Externalism and Epistemology. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  24. Harold King Chadwick (1916). A Suggested Metaphysics to Fit a Functional Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (14):365-371.
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  25. Josepho Wu Chang-teh (1970). Dal neopositivismo allo storicismo scientifico. L'evoluzione filosofica di Ludovico Geymonat. Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana.
  26. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  27. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  28. David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
  29. John Corcoran (2014). INVESTIGATING KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. In A. Buchsbaum A. Koslow (ed.), The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. SPRINGER 95-126.
    This work treats the correlative concepts knowledge and opinion, in various senses. In all senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, a belief known to be true is knowledge; a belief not known to be true is opinion. In this sense of ‘belief’, a belief is a proposition thought to be true—perhaps, but not necessarily, known to be true. All knowledge is truth. Some but not all opinion is truth. Every proposition known to be true is believed to be true. Some but (...)
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  30. Seth Crook (2000). The Millian Case for Orthodox Epistemic Conservatism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):549-573.
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  31. Daniel Dohrn (2014). Empirie, Expertise, Analyse. Der Fall Gettier. In T. Grundmann, J. Horvath & J. Kipper (eds.), Die experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Suhrkamp 213-234.
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  32. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  33. W. Dray (1957). R. G. Collingwood and the Acquaitance Theory of Knowledge. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11 (4):420-432.
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  34. Robert M. Ellis (2011). Truth on the Edge: A Brief Western Philosophy of the Middle Way. Lulu.Com.
    This book is a briefer and updated account of the Middle Way Philosophy developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. Its starting point is the argument that we are not justified in making any claims about truth, whether moral or scientific, but the idea of truth is still meaningful. Instead of making or denying metaphysical claims about truth, we need to think in terms of incrementally objective justification within experience. This standpoint is related to an account of objectivity as psychological (...)
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  35. Richard Feldman (2008). Modest Deontologism in Epistemology. Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
    Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in (...)
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  36. Hector Ferreiro (2013). La abstracción en la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel. Apuntes Filosóficos 21 (41).
    En la filosofía de Aristóteles y en la filosofía escolástica de cuño aristotélico, la abstracción constituía un acto fundamental del proceso cognitivo: marcaba el salto o ascenso de la sensibilidad a la inteligibilidad, del conocimiento del individuo al conocimiento de su esencia. En la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel, por el contrario, el concepto abstracto o, como Hegel prefiere llamarlo, la “representación abstracta” o “representación universal” es tan sólo un momento intermedio en el proceso fluido que va del conocimiento del (...)
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  37. W. Paul Franks & Richard Brian Davis (2013). Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology. Philosophia Christi 15:383-399.
    In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this account (...)
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  38. Roberto Frega (ed.) (2011). Pragmatist Epistemologies. Lexington Books.
    In a series of ten articles from leading American and European scholars, Pragmatist Epistemologies explores the central themes of epistemology in the pragmatist tradition through a synthesis of new and old pragmatist thought, engaging contemporary issues while exploring from a historical perspective. It opens a new avenue of research in contemporary pragmatism continuous with the main figures of pragmatist tradition and incorporating contemporary trends in philosophy. Students and scholars of American philosophy will find this book indispensable.
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  39. Ludovico Geymonat (1975). Sul concetto di 'crisi' della razionalità scientifica. Scientia 69 (10):325.
  40. Ludovico Geymonat (1973). Dibattito su "(Auto)critique de la science" con Levy-Leblond. Scientia 7.
  41. Ludovico Geymonat (1972). Unità della cultura. Scientia 1.
  42. Ludovico Geymonat (1972). L'impossibile neutralità. Scientia 66:753.
  43. Ludovico Geymonat (1967). Attualità delle indicazioni metodologiche galileiane. Atti Del Simposio Internazionale Su Andquot;Galileo Galilei Nella Storia E Nella Filosofia Della Scienza" (1964) - a Cura Del Gruppo Italiano di Storia Della Scienza, Firenze:205-215.
  44. Ludovico Geymonat (1958). Il pensiero scientifico. Garzanti.
  45. Ludovico Geymonat (1957, 1969). Galileo Galilei. Einaudi.
  46. Ludovico Geymonat (1936). Logica e filosofia della scienza. Rivista di Filosofia 37 (3):250-265.
  47. Ludovico Geymonat (1934). La nuova filosofia della natura in Germania. Bocca.
  48. Ludovico Geymonat & Mario Quaranta (1991). La Vienna Dei Paradossi Controversie Filosofiche E Scientifiche Nel Wiener Kreis. Il Poligrafo.
  49. Ludovico Geymonat & Mario Quaranta (eds.) (1981). Per Galileo. Bertani.
  50. Peter J. Graham, Megan Stotts, Zachary Bachman & Meredith McFadden (2015). Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and Benefits. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (4):7-13.
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