Bernard Mandeville’s theory of morality – ‘private vices, public benefits’ – provides a frame for comparing Adam Smith and David Hume on utility. Mandeville held that vice, not virtue, is useful for society. For him, the private and public good do not align. What is bad for individuals is often beneficial for society and vice versa. To counter Mandeville’s rhetoric and show the attractiveness of virtue, Hume places the principle of utility at the center of his An Enquiry concerning the (...) Principles of Morals (1751). This placement directs the reader’s attention away from the lack of alignment between private and public advantage and enables Hume to ‘dress’ moral virtue in utility and pleasure. Smith, by contrast, places the principle of propriety at the center of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). This is because he is closer in spirit to Mandeville than is Hume in acknowledging a gap between the private and public good. By directing the reader’s attention to this gap in Part IV, Smith tries to show, contra Hume, that the principle of propriety, not utility, better explains and defends praiseworthy action and choice in an imperfect world. (shrink)