The primary responsibility of the US Food and Drug Administration is to protect public health by ensuring the safety of the food supply. To that end, it sometimes conducts risk assessments of novel food products, such as genetically modified food. The FDA describes its regulatory review of GM food as a purely scientific activity, untainted by any normative considerations. This paper provides evidence that the regulatory agency is not justified in making that claim. It is argued that the FDA’s policy (...) stance on GM food is shaped by neoliberal considerations. The agency’s review of a genetically engineered animal, the AquAdvantage salmon, is used as a case study to track the influence of neoliberalism on its regulatory review protocol. After that, an epistemic argument justifying public engagement in the risk assessment of new GM food is outlined. It is because risk evaluations involve normative judgments, in a democracy, layperson representatives of informal epistemic communities that could be affected by a new GM food should have the opportunity to decide the ethical, political or other normative questions that arise during the regulatory review of that entity. (shrink)

Proposals for how to redesign democracy so as to better secure the demands of intergenerational justice can be divided into three broad families: (1) representative proxies; (2) differential voting schemes; and (3) counter-majoritarian devices. However, these proposals suffer from a fundamental weakness: namely, they all assume that despite the fact that democracy is by its very nature ill-equipped to secure intergenerational justice, it is nevertheless possible to rely on democracy to solve this problem in the first place. But that, to (...) put it colloquially, is like thinking that one can pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps. This paper sketches the shape and contours of a solution to this problem that is better able than the alternatives to escape this objection. This solution draws upon the strategy of a so-called ‘non-reformist reform.’. (shrink)

What is the wrong behind the widely criticized presentist bias of democracies? In this paper I argue that it is not that future generations are excluded from present-day democratic decision-making quite generally. Rather, I claim that due to the unique risks associated with representing future generations and the limitations on affecting future generations both institutionally and causally, the focus ought to be on including them on a more specific, narrower, set of issues, namely only those that threaten to lead to (...) their domination. I identify such issues as those that may end up being purpose-determining: that may subject future generations to previous generations’ will by forcing them to exert a substantial amount of their energies on dealing with problems caused by their predecessors. I conclude by reflecting on the extent to which political representation together with providing avenues of contestation can minimize the risk of intergenerational domination. (shrink)