Insofar as many older adults fit some definition of disability, disability studies and gerontology would seem to have common interests and goals. However, there has been little discussion between these fields. The aim of this paper is to open up the insights of disability studies as well as philosophy of disability to discussions in gerontology. In doing so, I hope to contribute to thinking about the good life in late life by more critically reflecting upon the meaning of the body, (...) ability, and the variability of each. My central argument is that we should conceptualize age‐associated bodily variations and abilities not in terms of individual capacity, but in terms of what I call “the extended body.” It is in light of the meaning of embodiment and ability in general that we must think differently and more capaciously about the meaning of late life in particular. (shrink)

Proposals for health care cost containment emphasize high-value care as a way to control spending without compromising quality. When used in this context, ‘value’ refers to outcomes in relation to cost. To determine where health spending yields the most value, it is necessary to compare the benefits provided by different treatments. While many studies focus narrowly on health gains in assessing value, the notion of benefit is sometimes broadened to include overall quality of life. This paper explores the implications of (...) using subjective quality of life measures for value assessment. This approach is claimed to be more respectful of patients and better capture the perspectival nature of quality of life. Even if this is correct, though, subjective measurement also raises challenging issues of interpersonal comparability when used to study health outcomes. Because such measures do not readily distinguish benefits due to medical interventions from benefits due to personal or other factors, they are not easily applied to the assessment of treatment value. I argue that when the outcome of interest in value assessment is broadened to include quality of life, the cost side of these measures should also be broadened. I show how one philosophical theory of well-being, Jason Raibley’s “agential flourishing” theory, can be adapted for use in quality of life research to better fit the needs and aims of value assessment in health care. Finally, I briefly note some implications of this argument for debates about fairness in health care allocations. (shrink)

One central and unfortunately unavoidable characteristic of the aging process is its association with chronic physiological deterioration. Frailty, cognitive impairment, and physical conditions such as cardiovascular disease and vision and hearing loss are more frequent in this phase of life, and these conditions translate into an increasing need for care and support of multiple kinds. In traditional bioethical scholarship, these distinctive features of aging have been examined predominantly through a health‐focused lens. My main contention in this essay, however, is that (...) viewing aging within bioethics as primarily a health problem, to be addressed through frameworks for decision‐making or for resource allocation, is inadequate. My aim is to consider how the health conditions associated with aging affect older people’s lives in a much more expansive way than has typically been acknowledged. Just as importantly, I intend to show how shifting our bioethical imagination in this way raises different and challenging questions about what a good life in late life consists in and about what is owed to older people, in their personal and social lives, as a matter of justice. (shrink)