Ampliative abduction

Abstract In Peirce's and Hanson's characterization of abductive inference, the abducted hypothesis (but not others) is present in the premises, so that the inference can hardly be taken as ampliative. Abduction has consequently been treated as part of the process whereby already generated hypotheses are judged in terms of their plausibility, simplicity, etc. I propose an interpretation of abduction which supports an ampliative view. It relies on a distinction between two logical stages in the generation of hypotheses, one ?factual? and one ?explanatory?. I also indicate how we may reconstruct Peirce's and Hanson's original inference in an ampliative form
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DOI 10.1080/02698599608573535
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I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Paul Thagard (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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