Why I am not a tropist

In M. Okada & B. Smith (eds.), Proceedings of the First Interdisciplinary Ontology Meeting (InterOntology 2008). Keio University Press 93-98 (2008)
A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities are particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, and in this paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer a reason why we ought to reject tropism, due to the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among entities. In the paper, two tentative accounts are considered and rejected: one postulating the existence of a relation of primitive resemblance; the other denying the existence of any similarity.
Keywords Tropes  Nominalism  Identity
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