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Tropes

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
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  1. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes. Dialogue 47 (1):53-64.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  2. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  3. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz (2002). Two Concepts of Trope. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):137-155.
    The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect of (...)
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  4. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  5. J. Bacon (2007). Review: If Tropes. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):459-462.
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  6. Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
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  7. Montse Bordes (1998). Abstract Particulars in a Four-Dimensional Frame. Dialectica 52:3-12.
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  8. Andrea Borghini, Why I Am Not a Tropist.
    A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities are particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, and in this paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer a reason why we ought to reject tropism, due to the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among entities. In the paper, (...)
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  9. Ross Cameron (2006). Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability. Dialectica 60 (2):99–113.
    In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider (...)
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  10. Keith Campbell (1990). Abstract Particulars. B. Blackwell.
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  11. Chad Carmichael (2013). Review of John Heil, The Universe As We Find It. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.
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  12. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Enduring States. In Christian Kanzian (ed.), Persistence. Ontos.
    The problem of how a concrete individual survives changes of its properties has long divided the philosophical community into ‘enduratists’ and ‘perduratists’. Enduratists take the idea of a surviving individual ontologi-cally seriously. They claim that many objects we encounter in our every-day (and for that matter also scientific) life endure in time, which means that these entities are wholly present at any time at which they exist. For those who are in principle happy with the conceptual framework of our ‘everyday’ (...)
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  13. Phil Corkum (2009). Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals. Ancient Philosophy 29 (2):289-310.
    As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years. One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle’s claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in. Here (...)
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  14. Richard Cross (2005). Relations, Universals, and the Abuse of Tropes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):53–72.
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  15. Arda Denkel (1997). On the Compresence of Tropes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):599-606.
    Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how the latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids (...)
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  16. Douglas Ehring (2011). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. OUP Oxford.
    Properties and objects are everywhere. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referring to them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but they remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope (...)
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  17. Douglas Ehring (2004). Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463.
    'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as (...)
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  18. Douglas Ehring (2002). The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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  19. Douglas Ehring (1997). Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes. Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
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  20. Peter Forrest, Sets As Mereological Tropes.
    Either from concrete examples such as tomatoes on a plate, an egg carton full of eggs and so on, or simply because of the braces notation, we come to have some intuitions about the sorts of things sets might be. (See Maddy 1990.) First we tend to think of a set of particulars as itself a particular thing.. Second, even after the distinction between settheory and mereology has been carefully explained we tend to think of the members of a set (...)
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  21. Thomas Frentz (2011). Creative Metaphors, Synchronicity, and Quantum Physics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2):101-128.
    The very notion of transposition, the constant theme of a theory of tropes, brings operations into play that legitimate a mixed approach involving psychology and linguistics.The recognition that science cannot do without metaphor—that all theories are elaborations of basic metaphors or systems of metaphors—is only one part of a larger emerging awareness of the pervasiveness of metaphor in all language.Metaphor always has about it precisely this revealing of hitherto unexpected connectives which we may note in the progressions of a dream.In (...)
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  22. André Fuhrmann (1991). Tropes and Laws. Philosophical Studies 63 (1):57 - 82.
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  23. Robert K. Garcia (forthcoming). Trope. In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd Edition.
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  24. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Tropes and Dependency Profiles: Problems for the Nuclear Theory of Substance. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):167-176.
    In this article I examine the compatibility of a leading trope bundle theory of substance, so-called Nuclear Theory, with trope theory more generally. Peter Simons (1994) originally proposed Nuclear Theory (NT), and continues to develop (1998, 2000) and maintain (2002/03) the view. Recently, building on Simons’s theory, Markku Keinänen (2011) has proposed what he calls the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT). Although the latter is supposed to shore up some of NT’s weaknesses, it continues to maintain NT’s central tenet, the premise (...)
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  25. Robert K. Garcia (2009). Nominalist Constituent Ontologies: A Development and Critique. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. -/- The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: -/- • What is the best nominalist account on offer? • How might (...)
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  26. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2009). Tropes for Causation. Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.
    Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.
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  27. S. C. Gibb (2012). Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation * by Douglas Ehring. Analysis 72 (4):850-851.
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  28. Daniel Giberman (2014). Tropes in Space. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):453-472.
    Tropes are particular features of concrete objects. Properties—the extensions of predicates—are primitive resemblance classes of tropes. Friends of tropes have been criticized for failing to answer three questions. First, are there fundamental items other than tropes? Second, what criteria determine whether some tropes are all and only the features of some one object? Third, can trope classes be formed adequately using only primitive resemblance? Trading on the spatiotemporal status of tropes, this essay offers new responses to each of these questions. (...)
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  29. Cody Gilmore (2013). Location and Mereology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  30. Lewis R. Gordon (2004). Critical Reflections on Three Popular Tropes in the Study of Whiteness. In George Yancy (ed.), What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question. Routledge.
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  31. Michael Gorman (2014). Two Types of Features: An Aristotelian Approach. Ratio 27 (2):140-154.
    A certain theory of substance, one that grows out of Aristotelian philosophy but which has adherents today as well, draws a distinction between the features a substance has by instantiating a universal and the features it has by possessing a trope. An adherent of this theory might say that a certain cat is red because it possesses a redness-trope, but that it is a cat because it instantiates the universal CAT. A problem that must be faced by philosophers who hold (...)
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  32. Simone Gozzano (2008). Tropes' Simplicity and Mental Causation. Ontos Verlag.
    In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem (...)
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  33. Simone Gozzano & Francesco Orilia (eds.) (2008). Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind. Ontos Verlag.
    Table of Contents; Introduction by Francesco Orilia and Simone Gozzano; Modes and Mind by John Heil; Does Ontology Matter? by Anna-Sofia Maurin; Basic Ontology, Multiple Realizability and Mental Causation by Francesco Orilia; The “Supervenience Argument”:Kim’s Challenge to Nonreductive Physicalism by Ausonio Marras and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri; Tropes’ Simplicity and Mental Causation by Simone Gozzano; Zombies from Below by David Robb; Tropes and Perception by E. Jonathan Lowe; About the authors.
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  34. Herbert Hochberg (2013). Nominalism and Idealism. Axiomathes 23 (2):213-234.
    The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.
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  35. Herbert Hochberg (1992). Troubles with Tropes. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):193 - 195.
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  36. Michael Anthony Istvan (2013). Análisis Nominalista de Una Entidad Que Está Siendo Caracterizada / “Nominalist Analyses of an Entity Being Charactered. Discusiones Filosóficas 21 (July-December):87-93.
    This paper is intended primarily as a reference tool for participants in the debate between realism and nominalism concerning universals. It provides an exhaustive catalogue of the basic analyses of an entity being charactered that nominalists can employ in both a constituent and nonconstituent ontology.
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  37. Michael Anthony Istvan (2011). On the Possibility of Exactly Similar Tropes. Abstracta 6 (2):158-177.
    In this paper I attempt to show, against certain versions of trope theory, that properties with analyzable particularity cannot be merely exactly similar: such properties are either particularized properties (tropes) that are dissimilar to every any other trope, or else universalized properties (universals). I argue that each of the most viable standard and nonstandard particularizers that can be employed to secure the numerical difference between exactly similar properties can only succeed in grounding the particularity of properties, that is, in having (...)
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  38. Markku Keinänen (2011). Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars? Dialectica 65 (3):419-450.
    This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory[SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons's (1994) Nuclear Theory[NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis's (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle theory (...)
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  39. Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen (2014). The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe. Erkenntnis 79 (1):65-79.
    This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence (...)
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  40. Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen (2010). Persistence of Simple Substances. Metaphysica 11 (2):119-135.
    In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist (3D'ist) solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory (SNT), which develops <span class='Hi'>Peter</span> Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism (3D) and four dimensionalism (4D), we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains (...)
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  41. Angus Kerr-Lawson (2009). Laws and Tropes. Overheard in Seville 27 (27):30-36.
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  42. Halla Kim (2008). Spinoza on Universals. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:149-155.
    Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual (...)
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  43. Max Kistler (2003). Laws of Nature, Exceptions and Tropes. Philosophia Scientiae 7 (2):189-219.
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  44. Uriah Kriegel (2005). Tropes and Facts. Metaphysica 6:83-90.
    The notion that there is a single type of entity in terms of which the whole world can be described has fallen out of favor in recent Ontology. There are only two serious exceptions to this. Factualists (Skyrms 1981, Armstrong 1997) hold that the world can be fully described in terms of facts. Trope theorists (Williams 1953, Campbell 1981, 1990) hold that it can be fully described in terms of tropes. Yet the relationship between facts and tropes remains obscure in (...)
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  45. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):5-20.
    The concept of appearance has had the historical misfortune of being associated with a Kantian or idealist program in metaphysics. Within this program, appearances are treated as "internal objects" that are immaterial and exert no causal powers over the physical world. However, there is a more mundane and innocuous notion of appearance, in which to say that x appears to y is just to say that y perceives x. In this more mundane sense of the term, an appearance is a (...)
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  46. Meinard Kuhlmann (2010). The Ultimate Constituents of the Material World - In Search of an Ontology for Fundamental Physics. ontos.
    Eventually, Kuhlmann proposes a dispositional trope ontology, according to which particularized properties and not things are the most basic entities.
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  47. Daryn Lehoux (2003). Tropes, Facts, and Empiricism. Perspectives on Science 11 (3):326-345.
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  48. Jerrold Levinson (2006). Why There Are No Tropes. Philosophy 81 (4):563-580.
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  49. Vassilios Livanios (2007). Tropes, Particularity, and Space-Time. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):357 - 368.
    Several difficulties, concerning the individuation and the variation of tropes, beset the initial classic version of trope theory. K. Campbell (Abstract particulars, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990) presented a modified version that aims to avoid those difficulties. Unfortunately, the revised theory cannot make the case that one of the fundamental tropes, space-time, is a genuine particular.
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  50. E. J. Lowe (2002). Properties, Modes, and Universals. The Modern Schoolman 79 (2-3):137-150.
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