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Tropes

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
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  1. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes. Dialogue 47 (1):53-64.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  2. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  3. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz (2002). Two Concepts of Trope. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):137-155.
    The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect of (...)
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  4. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  5. Charles Atkinson (1985). Research on Tropes. [REVIEW] Speculum 60 (3):684-685.
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  6. J. Bacon (2007). Review: If Tropes. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):459-462.
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  7. John Bacon (1989). A Single Primitive Trope Relation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (2):141 - 154.
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  8. Jiri Benovsky (2014). Tropes or Universals: How (Not) to Make One's Choice. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):69-86.
    This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is (...)
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  9. Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
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  10. Florian Boge (2014). Tropes With a Kantian Flavor. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 41 (99-100).
    This paper discusses one of the major problems for resemblance nominalism, posed by Bertrand Russell in 1911–12, and often referred to as Russell’s regress. It is the problem that resemblance must either be a universal, thus refuting a thorough nominalism, or must itself resemble other resemblances to count as a resemblance, which ultimately leads to an infinite regress of resemblances. I am going to discuss two solutions that have been proposed to this problem. I will then attempt to show in (...)
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  11. Montse Bordes (1998). Abstract Particulars in a Four-Dimensional Frame. Dialectica 52:3-12.
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  12. Andrea Borghini, Why I Am Not a Tropist.
    A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities are particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, and in this paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer a reason why we ought to reject tropism, due to the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among entities. In the paper, (...)
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  13. Ross Bruce (1991). Refiguring Nature: Tropes of Estrangement in Contemporary American Poetry. Analecta Husserliana 37:299-311.
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  14. Lance Brunner (1993). Tropes de I'ordinaire de la Messe: Tropes du Sanctus. [REVIEW] Speculum 68 (4):1143-1144.
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  15. Francesco F. Calemi (2012). Dal nominalismo al platonismo. Il problema degli universali nella filosofia contemporanea. Mimesis.
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  16. Ross Cameron (2006). Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non-Transferability. Dialectica 60 (2):99–113.
    In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider (...)
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  17. Keith Campbell (2008). Review of Simone Gozzano, Francesco Orilia (Eds.), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8).
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  18. Keith Campbell (1990). Abstract Particulars. B. Blackwell.
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  19. Chad Carmichael (2013). The Universe As We Find It, by John Heil. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.
    In this ambitious work, John Heil presents a fundamental ontology (chapters 1-8) consisting of finitely many substances and their properties (which he thinks of as particular, trope-like things), together with an account of causation, truthmaking, and a chapter on relations generally. He then applies this ontology (chapters 9-12) to a number of outstanding problems about reductionism, kinds, essences, emergence, consciousness, cognition, and much else. A final chapter reprises the main points about fundamental ontology from the first chapters.
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  20. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Enduring States. In Christian Kanzian (ed.), Persistence. Ontos.
    The problem of how a concrete individual survives changes of its properties has long divided the philosophical community into ‘enduratists’ and ‘perduratists’. Enduratists take the idea of a surviving individual ontologi-cally seriously. They claim that many objects we encounter in our every-day (and for that matter also scientific) life endure in time, which means that these entities are wholly present at any time at which they exist. For those who are in principle happy with the conceptual framework of our ‘everyday’ (...)
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  21. Paul Colilli (1989). Poliziano's Science of Tropes.
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  22. Phil Corkum (2009). Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals. Ancient Philosophy 29 (2):289-310.
    As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years. One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle’s claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in. Here (...)
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  23. Richard Cross (2005). Relations, Universals, and the Abuse of Tropes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):53–72.
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  24. Chris Daly (1994). Tropes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:253 - 261.
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  25. Christopher Daly (1997). Tropes. In D. H. Mellor & A. Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press. 140-59.
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  26. Alain de Libera (2002). Des accidents aux tropes. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):479-500.
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  27. Arda Denkel (1997). On the Compresence of Tropes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):599-606.
    Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how the latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids (...)
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  28. S. C. Gibb E. J. Lowe (ed.) (forthcoming). The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate. Oxford University Press.
  29. Douglas Ehring (2011). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. Oup Oxford.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
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  30. Douglas Ehring (2004). Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463.
    'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as (...)
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  31. Douglas Ehring (2002). The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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  32. Douglas Ehring (1997). Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes. Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
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  33. Simon Floth, The Other Basic Aspect of Reality.
    It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence (...)
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  34. Marina Folescu (2015). Thinking About Different Nonexistents of the Same Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):n/a-n/a.
    How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling's prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts? It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon (...)
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  35. Peter Forrest (2002). Sets As Mereological Tropes. Metaphysica 3 (1).
    Either from concrete examples such as tomatoes on a plate, an egg carton full of eggs and so on, or simply because of the braces notation, we come to have some intuitions about the sorts of things sets might be. (See Maddy 1990.) First we tend to think of a set of particulars as itself a particular thing.. Second, even after the distinction between settheory and mereology has been carefully explained we tend to think of the members of a set (...)
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  36. Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.) (2008). Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
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  37. Thomas Frentz (2011). Creative Metaphors, Synchronicity, and Quantum Physics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2):101-128.
    The very notion of transposition, the constant theme of a theory of tropes, brings operations into play that legitimate a mixed approach involving psychology and linguistics.The recognition that science cannot do without metaphor—that all theories are elaborations of basic metaphors or systems of metaphors—is only one part of a larger emerging awareness of the pervasiveness of metaphor in all language.Metaphor always has about it precisely this revealing of hitherto unexpected connectives which we may note in the progressions of a dream.In (...)
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  38. André Fuhrmann (1991). Tropes and Laws. Philosophical Studies 63 (1):57 - 82.
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  39. Eric Funkhouser (2004). Review of Anna-Sofia Maurin, If Tropes. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).
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  40. Ofer Gal (1994). Tropes and Topics in Scientific Discourse: Galileo's De Motu. Science in Context 7 (1).
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  41. Robert K. Garcia (forthcoming). Sobre la Expresión “Propiedades Particularizadas”: Tropos Modificadores y Tropos Módulo. In Ezequiel Zerbudis (ed.), Poderes Causales, Tropos, y Otras Criaturas Extrañas: Ensayos de Metafísica Analítica. Título.
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  42. Robert K. Garcia (forthcoming). Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
    I aim to synthesize two issues within theistic metaphysics. The first concerns the metaphysics of creaturely properties and, more specifically, the nature of unshareable properties, or tropes. The second concerns the metaphysics of providence and, more specifically, the way in which God sustains creatures, or sustenance. I propose that creaturely properties, understood as what I call modifier tropes, are identical with divine acts of sustenance, understood as acts of property-conferral. I argue that this *theistic conferralism* is attractive because it integrates (...)
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  43. Robert K. Garcia (forthcoming). Two Ways to Particularize a Property. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier (...)
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  44. Robert K. Garcia (2015). Is Trope Theory a Divided House? In Gabriele Galluzzo Michael Loux (ed.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 133-155.
    In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...)
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  45. Robert K. Garcia (2015). Trope. In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd Edition.
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  46. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Tropes and Dependency Profiles: Problems for the Nuclear Theory of Substance. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):167-176.
    In this article I examine the compatibility of a leading trope bundle theory of substance, so-called Nuclear Theory, with trope theory more generally. Peter Simons (1994) originally proposed Nuclear Theory (NT), and continues to develop (1998, 2000) and maintain (2002/03) the view. Recently, building on Simons’s theory, Markku Keinänen (2011) has proposed what he calls the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT). Although the latter is supposed to shore up some of NT’s weaknesses, it continues to maintain NT’s central tenet, the premise (...)
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  47. Robert K. Garcia (2009). Nominalist Constituent Ontologies: A Development and Critique. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. -/- The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: -/- • What is the best nominalist account on offer? • How might (...)
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  48. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2009). Tropes for Causation. Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.
    <span class='Hi'>Tropes</span>, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.
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  49. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2013). Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (4):279-281.
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  50. S. C. Gibb (2012). Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation * by Douglas Ehring. Analysis 72 (4):850-851.
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