Wittgenstein and Scepticism

Philosophy Research Archives 12:163-176 (1986)
Abstract A unifying perspective to bring to bear on Wittgenstein’s thought is that it represents a continual grappling with the problem of formulating a consistent version of scepticism--one that would not succumb to the charge of being self-refuting. His ultimate resolution of this problem hinges upon the precise content to be invested in his famous philosophical doctrine of the priority of Gezeigt (showing) over Gezagt (saying). I shall argue for a democratic participatory gloss of this doctrine as offering the most satisfactory resolution to the sceptical dilemmas haunting Wittgenstein
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    Ian Hacking (1985). Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    A. Lewis (1988). Wittgenstein and Rule-Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):280-304.

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