|Abstract||Naturalistic explanations (of linguistic behaviour) have to answer two questions: What is meant by giving a naturalistic explanation, and what does it explain after all? Two kinds of descriptivism present in Wittgenstein´s work are distinguished and applied to Hirsch´s “division problem”. They answer the two questions raised and keeping in mind their distinction is important to assess naturalistic explanations|
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