Abstract

In this paper, I examine the notion of the ‘psychological dynamics’ that Professor Shun uses for explicating Confucian moral anger, based on David Hume’s (1711–76) psychological account of mind, to reconsider the role that object-based distinctions of emotions play in the Confucian moral tradition. First, by appealing to Hume’s investigation of the mental processes involved in feeling moral sentiments, I suggest that imagination, as a component in the ‘psychological dynamics’, explains how ‘dust’ settles on the mind to yield inappropriate emotional responses. Second, by re-examining Confucius’s approval of Yan Hui’s moral anger, that he ‘never misdirects his anger’, I argue that though Confucians would not characterize the difference in emotional responses by distinguishing the first- and third-person perspectives, their goal of moral self-cultivation would encourage them to recognize the practical significance of distinguishing objects in situations, along with perceiving situations as a whole. While our minds as mental mirrors can reflect the whole situation, they are unique mirrors that resonate more vigorously with specific objects such as others’ minds.