What's wrong with tonk(?)

Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):217 - 226 (2005)
In “The Runabout Inference Ticket” AN Prior (1960) examines the idea that logical connectives can be given a meaning solely in virtue of the stip- ulation of a set of rules governing them, and thus that logical truth/conse- quence
Keywords Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
Arthur Prior (1967). The Runabout Inference Ticket. In Peter Strawson (ed.), Analysis. Oxford University Press 38-9.
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.

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Heinrich Wansing (2006). Connectives Stranger Than Tonk. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):653 - 660.

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