Abstract

This paper is an evaluation and expansion of William Hasker’s transcendental argument against determinism. Hasker’s argument attempts to show that determinism is logically incompatible with rationality and justified belief. Hasker claims this argument to be conclusive given two independent qualifications: first that the argument only applies to a specific form of determinism, and second that the argument rests on a specific conception of rationality. My aim in this paper will be to modify and expand Hasker’s argument such that it (1) applies to the more general deterministic thesis (as defined below), and (2), rests on a modified epistemic conception of rationally unaffirmable beliefs. I will attempt to do (2) by modeling Hasker’s argument after one of Alvin Plantinga’s epistemological arguments against naturalism, and hope to show that such an argumentative model is superior for the conclusion Hasker wishes to bring out. I will begin by explicating Hasker’s argument, and then I will move to the modification and expansion of the argument.