Plausibility and Probability in Juridical Proof

International Journal of Evidence and Proof 23 (1-2) (2019)
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Abstract

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.

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Marcello Di Bello
Arizona State University

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