An Identity Theory of Truth

St. Martin's Press (2000)
This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory , while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
Keywords Truth Correspondence theory
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Call number BD171.D63 2000
ISBN(s) 9780312231996   0312231997  
DOI 10.1093/mind/112.445.112
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Matthew McGrath (2003). What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666–688.

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