David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 107 (425):33-58 (1998)
We call a semantic theory 'classical' if it includes the assertions that (I) a function V assigning semantic value maps object language proper names into some set D, (ii) V maps object language atomic sentences into some set F, and (iii) the extension of any object language unary predicate is a member of the power set of D. Two theorems can be proven which assert that any classical theory which includes certain other assumptions assigns the same member of F to every true object language sentence. Many accept the following argument: (1) every plausible semantic theory is classical and contains the assertions named in the theorems, (2) if the semantic value of declarative sentences is a representation or representational then, some different true sentences differ in what they represent, hence, declarative sentences are not representational. I show how to avoid the conclusion by arguing for the falsity of (1).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
D. Bellé & F. Parlamento (2006). Truth in V for Ǝ ∀∀-Sentences Is Decidable. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (4):1200 - 1222.
Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber (1988). Mood and the Analysis of Non-Declarative Sentences. In J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik & C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value. Stanford University Press. 77--101.
Brian P. Keane (2008). On Representing Objects with a Language of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):113 – 127.
Hannes Leitgeb (2005). What Truth Depends On. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
Hartry Field (2003). A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Alberto Voltolini (2007). Names for Ficta, for Intentionalia, and for Nothing. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 183-197.
Maria van der Schaar (2007). The Assertion-Candidate and the Meaning of Mood. Synthese 159 (1):61-82.
Maria van Der Schaar (2007). The Assertion-Candidate and the Meaning of Mood. Synthese 159 (1):61 - 82.
Andrzej Wiśniewski (1994). Erotetic Implications. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):173 - 195.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #71,840 of 1,696,560 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #43,589 of 1,696,560 )
How can I increase my downloads?