David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Religious Ethics 1:37-52 (1973)
Contemporary moral philosophy tends to equate what is moral with what is obligatory. Hence, there is a tendency to exclude all virtues from what is moral because they are dispositions other than the one morally good disposition to fulfill obligations out of a sense of obligation. This has the effect of excluding much of what we admire about persons from moral philosophy and from the moral life. This essay argues that there are at least two virtues, both forms of love, moral perceptivity and moral tenacity, which are moral and obligatory. The author explores some of the relationships of these two moral virtues to the traditional theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, and to heroism and saintliness
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