Can Raz consistently suppose that fundamental moral principles are satiable?

Abstract

Joseph Raz claims that the fundamental principles of morality and politics are satiable: there is a point at which one has fulfilled them. I argue that Raz cannot consistently endorse this claim, given his approach to saving lives.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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