Marc Lange on essentialism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):75 – 79 (2005)
Abstract
For scientific essentialists, the only logical possibilities of existence are the real (or metaphysical) ones, and such possibilities, they say, are relative to worlds. They are not a priori, and they cannot just be invented. Rather, they are discoverable only by the a posteriori methods of science. There are, however, many philosophers who think that real possibilities are knowable a priori, or that they can just be invented. Marc Lange [Lange 2004] thinks that they can be invented, and tries to use his inventions to argue that the essentialist theory of counterfactual conditionals developed in Scientific Essentialism [Ellis 2001, hereafter SE] is flawed.
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Ellis (1976). The Existence of Forces. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (2):171-185.
Citations of this work BETA
John Roberts (2010). Some Laws of Nature Are Metaphysically Contingent. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
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