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  1. Marc Lange (2013). Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):255-261.
    It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle (...)
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  2. Marc Lange (2013). Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift. Philosophy of Science 80 (2):169-188.
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  3. Marc Lange, Peter Vickers, John Michael, Miles MacLeod, Alexander R. Pruss, David John Baker, Clark Glymour & Simon Fitzpatrick (2013). 1. Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift (Pp. 169-188). Philosophy of Science 80 (2).
     
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  4. Marc Lange (2012). Abstraction and Depth in Scientific Explanation. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):483-491.
  5. Marc Lange (2012). 6.” There Sweep Great General Principles Which All the Laws Seem to Follow. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:154.
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  6. Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange (2011). Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation. Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (3):245-256.
  7. Marc Lange (2011). Conservation Laws in Scientific Explanations: Constraints or Coincidences? Philosophy of Science 78 (3):333-352.
    A conservation law in physics can be either a constraint on the kinds of interaction there could be or a coincidence of the kinds of interactions there actually are. This is an important, unjustly neglected distinction. Only if a conservation law constrains the possible kinds of interaction can a derivation from it constitute a scientific explanation despite failing to describe the causal/mechanical details behind the result derived. This conception of the relation between “bottom-up” scientific explanations and one kind of “top-down” (...)
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  8. Marc Lange (2011). 3 It Takes More Than All Kinds to Make a World. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. Mit Press. 53.
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  9. Marc Lange & Alexander Rosenberg (2011). Can There Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):591 - 599.
    Sober 2011 argues that, contrary to Hume, some causal statements can be known a priori to be true?notably, some ?would promote? statements figuring in causal models of natural selection. We find Sober's argument unconvincing. We regard the Humean thesis as denying that causal explanations contain any a priori knowable statements specifying certain features of events to be causally relevant. We argue that not every ?would promote? statement is genuinely causal, and we suggest that Sober has not shown that his examples (...)
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  10. Marc Lange, Raphael van Riel, Maximilian Schlosshauer, Gregory Wheeler, Zalán Gyenis, Miklós Rédei, John Byron Manchak, James Owen Weatherall, Bruce Glymour & Bradford Skow (2011). 10. Discussion: Problems for Natural Selection as a Mechanism Discussion: Problems for Natural Selection as a Mechanism (Pp. 512-523). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (3).
     
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  11. Jim Woodward, Barry Loewer, John Carroll & Marc Lange (2011). Counterfactuals All the Way Down? Metascience 20 (1):27-52.
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience Online (...)
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  12. Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange (2010). On Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation. Iris 2 (3):245-256.
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  13. Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange (2009). Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective di Bas van Fraassen. Iride 22 (3):707-720.
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  14. Marc Lange (2009). A Tale of Two Vectors. Dialectica 63 (4):397-431.
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  15. Marc Lange (2009). Causation in Classical Mechanics. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
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  16. Marc Lange (2009). Dimensional Explanations. Noûs 43 (4):742-775.
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  17. Marc Lange (2009). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. Oxford University Press.
    Laws form counterfactually stable sets -- Natural necessity -- Three payoffs of my account -- A world of subjunctives.
     
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  18. Marc Lange (2009). Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):312-345.
    The beauty of electricity, or of any other force, is not that the power is mysterious and unexpected, touching every sense at unawares in turn, but that it is under law... Michael Faraday, Wheatstone's Electric Telegraph's Relation to Science (being an argument in favour of the full recognition of Science as a branch of Education), 1854.
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  19. Marc Lange (2009). Scientific Inquiry. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues in Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  20. Marc Lange (2009). Why Do the Laws Explain Why? In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
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  21. Marc Lange (2009). Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction Are Generally Not Explanatory. Analysis 69 (2):203-211.
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  22. Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
    After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...)
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  23. Marc Lange (2008). Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make. Analysis 68 (298):120–128.
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  24. Marc Lange (2007). Introduction to Part II. In , Philosophy of Science: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub.. 25--33.
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  25. Marc Lange (2007). Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature: Conservation Laws and Symmetries. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (3):457-481.
  26. Marc Lange (2007). Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):457-481.
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  27. Marc Lange (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Science: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub..
    Philosophy of Science: An Anthology assembles some of the finest papers in the philosophy of science since 1945, showcasing enduring classics alongside important and innovative recent work. Introductions by the editor highlight connections between selections, and contextualize the articles Nine sections address topics at the heart of philosophy of science, including realism and the character of scientific theories, scientific explanations and laws of nature, singular casusation, and the metaphysical implications of modern physics Provides an authoritative and accessible overview of the (...)
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  28. Marc Lange (2007). Review of Huw Price, Richard Corry (Eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (11).
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  29. Marc Lange (2007). The End of Diseases. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):265-292.
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  30. Marc Lange (2006). Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
    I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...)
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  31. Marc Lange (2006). Farewell to Laws of Nature? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):361-369.
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  32. Marc Lange (2006). How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws. Mind 115 (460):917--946.
    Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds (µs). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7µs. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David (...)
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  33. Marc Lange (2005). A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):277 - 303.
    This paper analyzes the logical truths as (very roughly) those truths that would still have been true under a certain range of counterfactual perturbations.What’s nice is that the relevant range is characterized without relying (overtly, at least) upon the notion of logical truth. This approach suggests a conception of necessity that explains what the different varieties of necessity (logical, physical, etc.) have in common, in virtue of which they are all varieties of necessity. However, this approach places the counterfactual conditionals (...)
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  34. Marc Lange (2005). How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill its Causal Role? Philosophical Review 114 (4):433-468.
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  35. Marc Lange (2005). Laws and Their Stability. Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.
    Many philosophers have believed that the laws of nature differ from the accidental truths in their invariance under counterfactual perturbations. Roughly speaking, the laws would still have held had q been the case, for any q that is consistent with the laws. (Trivially, no accident would still have held under every such counterfactual supposition.) The main problem with this slogan (even if it is true) is that it uses the laws themselves to delimit qs range. I present a means of (...)
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  36. Marc Lange (2005). Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):581 – 588.
    In Lange 2004a, I argued that 'scientific essentialism' [Ellis 2001 cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis 2005 and Toby Handfield 2005 have defended essentialism against my charge. Here I argue that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the 'closest possible world' where the electron's electric charge is 5% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural kinds (...)
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  37. James Ladyman & Marc Lange (2004). Visit Our Website at Http://Www. Blackwellpublishing. Com. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Pub.. 24.
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  38. Marc Lange (2004). A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.
    Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.
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  39. Marc Lange (2004). Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne Myrvold. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):205-215.
    Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.
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  40. Marc Lange (2004). Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702–712.
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  41. Marc Lange (2004). Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702-712.
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  42. Marc Lange (2004). The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):93-109.
    Rosenberg has recently argued that explanations supplied by (what he calls) functional biology are mere promissory notes for macromolecular adaptive explanations. Rosenberg's arguments currently constitute one of the most substantial challenges to the autonomy, irreducibility, and indispensability of the explanations supplied by functional biology. My responses to Rosenberg's arguments will generate a novel account of the autonomy of functional biology. This account will turn on the relations between counterfactuals, scientific explanations, and natural laws. Crucially, in their treatment of the laws' (...)
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  43. Marc Lange (2004). Would "Direct Realism" Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? Noûs 38 (2):197–232.
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  44. Marc Lange (2002). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics. Blackwell.
    This book combines physics, history, and philosophy in a radical new approach to introducing the philosophy of physics.
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  45. Marc Lange (2002). Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy. Analysis 62 (4):281–285.
    Among the niftiest arguments for scientific anti-realism is the ‘pessimistic induction’ (also sometimes called ‘the disastrous historical meta-induction’). Although various versions of this argument differ in their details (see, for example, Poincare 1952: 160, Putnam 1978: 25, and Laudan 1981), the argument generally begins by recalling the many scientific theories that posit unobservable entities and that at one time or another were widely accepted. The anti-realist then argues that when these old theories were accepted, the evidence for them was quite (...)
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  46. Marc Lange (2002). Okasha on Inductive Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232.
    In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive (...)
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  47. Marc Lange (2002). Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 57 (3):281Ð301.
    Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus (...)
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  48. Marc Lange (2001). The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation as a Side Effect: A Reply to Maher. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):575-588.
    has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.
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  49. Marc Lange (2001). The Most Famous Equation. Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):219-238.
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  50. Marc Lange (2000). Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective by Virtue of Being Non-Commutative? Remarks on the Sameness of Sensory Experiences. Synthese 123 (3):393 - 403.
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