David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 103 (2):141--52 (1995)
There are several distinct components of the realist anti-realist debate. Since each side in the debate has its disadvantages, it is tempting to try to combine realist theses with anti-realist theses in order to obtain a better, more moderate position. Putnam attempts to hold a realist concept of truth, yet he rejects realist metaphysics and realist semantics. He calls this view internal realism. Truth is realist on this picture for it is objective, rather than merely intersubjective, and eternal. Putnam introduces a concept of epistemic idealization — epistemically ideal conditions, or idealized justification — to try to ground the strong objectivity of truth without sliding into metaphysical realism. I argue that the concept of ideal conditions to which Putnam appeals does not cohere with his (anti-realist) commitment to an assertability conditions account of meaning.
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References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1990). Realism with a Human Face. Harvard University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1987). The Many Faces of Realism. Open Court.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press.
Gary Ebbs (1992). Realism and Rational Inquiry. Philosophical Topics 20 (1):1-33.
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