Abstract

Care, we suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to us which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, we develop a volition: we want that which promotes the thriving – even to the smallest extent – of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how we may establish what that entails. Eventually we take practical action: we act according to our volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, we release the source of the appeal from our care. As far as we can see, this quartet – appeal, concern, volition and practice – covers the four constitutive moments of care, although these moments are only theoretically separable from one another. The practice, as we have said, follows the volition. The volition, however, has arisen because we wanted to foster the wellbeing, however we may have recognised this, of the subject from which the initial appeal came. We have thus placed our volition in the service of this wellbeing, that is to say: we have subjected ourselves to an ought which we instantiated ourselves with the acceptance of the appeal. This seems to us to be the decisive point: in the act of caring, we instantiate an ought, a regulative element, which we then willingly follow. In the process of caring, we thus bring forth an ought, from our own being as it were – and as short-lived as this may be – to which we subject ourselves: in the process of caring, normativity only appears at all because we produce a will in the interest of the subject of the initial appeal to which we then dedicate ourselves, as if this were not our own will. Normativity is thus, as we further suspect, to be understood as a descriptive term of a phenomenology of care, or indeed a phenomenology of normativity. The phenomenon of caring provides the first indication that the ought arises directly from the practical experience of our lives. The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, we use the term nursing. The professional caregiver purposefully exposes him/herself to appeals, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. The first fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal – in a particular situation at a particular time – and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation. We believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide, on the one hand, an exact understanding of the genesis of normativity, and on the other hand, in its practical application, a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions.