Is “Simple Reliabilism” Adequately Motivated?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):444-450 (2003)
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Abstract

There is an irony about this that can only be appreciated by considering carefully Greco’s epistemological method. With alacrity and equanimity, Greco denies the efficacy of skeptical arguments as arguments that the conditions required for empirical knowledge are not fulfilled. His confidence in this matter is not the result of an elaborate anti-skeptical argument. Rather, it is born of an awareness that there are clear cases of empirical knowledge. This I find refreshing. The shortest route to denying the generalization embodied in knowledge-skepticism is producing counterexamples to the generalization by identifying bona fide cases of empirical knowledge. This is embarrassingly easy to do. G. E. Moore exhibited a special talent for this when he held up his two hands and laconically remarked, “Here is one hand, and here is another.”

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