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Do conflicting intentions give rise to multiple demonstrative reference? Reply to Mena
Manuscrito 43 (4):189-198 (2020)
Abstract
According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Dthat.David Kaplan - 1978 - In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243.
The role of perception in demonstrative reference.Susanna Siegel - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-21.
Roads to Reference: An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language.Mario Gómez Torrente - 2019 - Oxford, Reino Unido: Oxford University Press.
Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on Gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”.Filipe Martone - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (4):49-58.
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