19 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Declan Smithies (Ohio State University, Australian National University)
  1. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem? In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies in Epistemology. Routledge.
    This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that foundationalism and access internalism form (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides the best explanation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Why Justification Matters. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Declan Smithies (2013). On the Unreliability of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.
    In his provocative and engaging new book, Perplexities of Consciousness, Eric Schwitzgebel makes a compelling case that introspection is unreliable in the sense that we are prone to ignorance and error in making introspective judgments about our own conscious experience. My aim in this commentary is to argue that Schwitzgebel’s thesis about the unreliability of introspection does not have the damaging implications that he claims it does for the prospects of a broadly Cartesian approach to epistemology.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Declan Smithies (2013). Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  6. Declan Smithies (2013). Teaching and Learning Guide for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):999-1002.
    Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical significance. Debated questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology include the following: What is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the intentionality of cognition? And what is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the phenomenology (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
    This is the first in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
    This is the second in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Declan Smithies (2012). A Simple Theory of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
    This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Declan Smithies (2012). The Mental Lives of Zombies. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
    What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental role as a norm of belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (2012). Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview. In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.) (2011). Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than half a century, but until recently it was largely neglected in philosophy. Now, however, attention has been recognized by philosophers of mind as having an important role to play in our theories of consciousness and of cognition. At the same time, several recent developments in psychology have led psychologists to foundational questions about the nature of attention and its implementation in the brain. As a result there has been a convergence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Declan Smithies (2011). What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought? Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.
    Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why it is. First, I consider and reject the accounts proposed by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference and by John (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Declan Smithies (2006). Rationality and the Subject's Point of View. Dissertation, New York University
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation