How do speech acts express psychological states?
In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press (2007)
| Abstract | forthcoming in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge) | |||||||||
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Mark Siebel (2003). Illocutionary Acts and Attitude Expression. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):351-366.
Carleton B. Christensen (1991). Language and Intentionality: A Critical Examination of John Searle's Later Theory of Speech Acts and Intentionality. Königshausen & Neumann.
Joshua Rust (2009). John Searle. Continuum.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell Green, Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Armin Burkhardt (ed.) (1990). Speech Acts, Meaning, and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle. W. De Gruyter.
John Searle (1985). Expression and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
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