Abstract

This study develops a particular interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and extends it to contemporary philosophical concerns. I claim that the Phenomenology is a critique of an epistemic concept, 'consciousness', and that the Phenomenology should therefore be viewed generally as a critique of mentalism. 'Mentalism' refers to both a body of beliefs and certain habits of thought that presuppose the subjectivity of mind, and that picture mind and mental items as standing in a problematic relation to what is taken to be the objectivity of reality. I claim that the interpretation of Hegel as a critic of mentalism clarifies Hegel's overall systematic intentions, and therefore clarifies the relation of the Phenomenology to the Science of Logic. ;I argue that the reading of Hegel that is developed here is relevant to contemporary philosophy. I examine works by John McDowell, Robert Brandom, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. I draw analogies between Hegel and the later Wittgenstein, who I claim was also a critic of mentalism. I argue that insofar as Hegel and Wittgenstein are critics of mentalism, it is a significant error to read either of them as espousing any form of idealism