Abstract

The author points out that the psychological concepts are not present in the earliest formulations of psychoanalytic theory, and the implications of this fact are fully drawn out. The early theory of pathological defense is explored in detail, with an eye to understanding the subsequent distinction between conscious and unconscious. A great deal of attention is paid to Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology". In the present context, the importance of the "Project" stems from the fact that various of its irresolvable problems force Freud to evolve a new, essentially psychological theory of mind. It is this theory--the so-called "topographical model"--in relation to which the concept of the dynamic unconscious is first articulated, and in which the concepts conscious and unconscious finally assume their pre-eminent position as explanatory constructs. ;The topographical model is then criticized: firstly, on account of Freud's confusion concerning the bilateral role of consciousness, secondly, on account of his ad hoc and topographically inconsistent analysis of dream consciousness, and finally, in consequence of the criticisms Freud himself levels at the topographical conception of the psychological concepts. ;The question of the post-topographical conception of the psychological concepts is then addressed. It is pointed out that Freud had grave doubts about the theoretical significance of the psychological concepts in the post-topographical period. These doubts are then examined and the question of theoretical significance resolved: the psychological concepts are reinstated as basic, theoretical constructs. In so doing, the author not only reinterprets the psychological concepts themselves, but the entire body of constructs and propositions constituting the conceptual core of Freud's theory of mind. However, it is hoped that such a reconstruction remains faithful to the spirit, if not always the letter, of the text