A note on pretense and co-reference

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400 (2010)
Anna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.
Keywords Fiction  Pretense  Kendall Walton
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DOI 10.2307/40783273
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References found in this work BETA
Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.
Antony Eagle (2007). Telling Tales. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):125 - 147.
Kendall L. Walton (1973). Pictures and Make-Believe. Philosophical Review 82 (3):283-319.

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