Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief

Oxford University Press (2000)
Abstract
In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction.
Keywords Induction (Logic  Science Philosophy
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Call number BC91.H69 2000
ISBN(s) 0198250371  
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Peter Millican (2011). Twenty Questions About Hume's “Of Miracles”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:151-192.
Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.

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