David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S1-S11 (2002)
A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross‐disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation that cannot be removed as well as a prior justification. A form of selective realism is described which denies that one can simply read the ontological commitments from the theory itself
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tarja Knuuttila (2011). Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):262-271.
Jay Odenbaugh & Anna Alexandrova (2011). Buyer Beware: Robustness Analyses in Economics and Biology. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):757-771.
Tarja Knuuttila & Andrea Loettgers (2011). Causal Isolation Robustness Analysis: The Combinatorial Strategy of Circadian Clock Research. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):773-791.
Similar books and articles
Ronan Reilly & Ralph Radach (2003). Methodologies for Comparing Complex Computational Models of Eye-Movement Control in Reading: Just Fitting the Data is Not Enough. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):499-500.
Subrata Dasgupta (2008). Shedding Computational Light on Human Creativity. Perspectives on Science 16 (2):pp. 121-136.
David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm, or, Why Do You Think They Call It Artificial Intelligence? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.
John Symons (2008). Computational Models of Emergent Properties. Minds and Machines 18 (4):475-491.
David J. Kijowski, Harry Dankowicz & Michael C. Loui (2013). Observations on the Responsible Development and Use of Computational Models and Simulations. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):63-81.
David Michael Kaplan (2011). Explanation and Description in Computational Neuroscience. Synthese 183 (3):339-373.
Paul Thagard (1986). Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #75,171 of 1,696,233 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #111,282 of 1,696,233 )
How can I increase my downloads?