Coevolution of role preference and fairness in the ultimatum game

Complexity 18 (1):56-64 (2013)
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Abstract

We present a metapopulation dynamic model for the diffusively-coupled rock-paper-scissors game with mutation in scale-free hierarchical networks. We investigate how the RPS game changes by mutation in scale-free networks. Only the mutation from rock to scissors occurs with rate μ. In the network, a node represents a patch where the RPS game is performed. RPS individuals migrate among nodes by diffusion. The dynamics are represented by the reaction-diffusion equations with the recursion formula. We study where and how species coexist or go extinct in the scale-free network. We numerically obtained the solutions for the metapopulation dynamics and derived the transition points. The results show that, with increasing mutation rate μ, the extinction of P species occurs and then the extinction of R species occurs, and finally only S species survives. Thus, the first and second dynamical phase transitions occur in the scale-free hierarchical network. We also show that the scaling law holds for the population dynamics which suggests that the transition points approach zero in the limit of infinite size.

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