Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model

Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142 (2009)
De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.
Keywords Body Representation  de Vignemont  Self Consciousness  Sense of Embodiment  Sense of Ownership
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DOI 10.1080/09515080902802785
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