Abstract
John Dewey coined the imperative that what we do in philosophy «must take effects in conduct» if it is
not to be a sentimental indulgence for a few. This article asks whether it suffices when an insight only makes a
difference in someone’s mind, to make it a legitimate aim of research. Four kinds of insights are distinguished: meta-
physical insights, ethical insights, practical insights, and trivial insights. Metaphysical insights are those that bring us
purely cognitive benefits – no other benefits than a change in our thoughts. This article argues that metaphysical
insights, properly demarcated, entail a particular kind of significance, which makes them worthy of pursuit, despite
only yielding cognitive benefits. The article also points out, however, that we need to think carefully about how these
cognitive benefits are socially distributed, and how we make the decision about which metaphysical inquiries are to
be pursued.