Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation Into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kluwer Academic Publishers (2004)
This monograph provides a new account of justified inference as a cognitive process. In contrast to the prevailing tradition in epistemology, the focus is on low-level inferences, i.e., those inferences that we are usually not consciously aware of and that we share with the cat nearby which infers that the bird which she sees picking grains from the dirt, is able to fly. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such inferences. Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed. Part 3 recalls and extends various systems of deductive and nonmonotonic logic and thereby explains the semantics of absolute and high reliability. In Part 4 it is proven that qualitative neural networks are able to draw justified deductive and nonmonotonic inferences on the basis of distributed representations. This is derived from a soundness/completeness theorem with regard to cognitive semantics of nonmonotonic reasoning. The appendix extends the theory both logically and ontologically, and relates it to A. Goldman's reliability account of justified belief. This text will be of interest to epistemologists and logicians, to all computer scientists who work on nonmonotonic reasoning and neural networks, and to cognitive scientists.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Inference Cognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$192.34 new (29% off) $201.88 used (25% off) $269.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD161.L374 2004|
|ISBN(s)||9048166691 1402024924 9781402024924|
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz (2014). A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-Probabilistic Systems. Studia Logica 102 (4):867-890.
Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn (2012). REWARD VERSUS RISK IN UNCERTAIN INFERENCE: THEOREMS AND SIMULATIONS. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
Hannes Leitgeb (2012). A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
Hannes Leitgeb (2011). Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things. Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
Gerhard Schurz (2011). Truth-Conduciveness as the Primary Epistemic Justification of Normative Systems of Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266-267.
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