Abstract

Ostensibly accepting Lockean property theory and some basic assumptions of Nozick’s entitlement theory, Barbara Fried argues that property owners have a right to the physical things they own, but not to their “surplus value,” which is produced not by the owner’s labour but by “scarcity conditions of one sort or another.” I argue that Fried’s interpretations of Nozick and Locke lead her to a conclusion that is not supported by those Lockean and Nozickian entitlement principles which she does accept. I also argue that Nozick’s weaker interpretation of the Lockean Proviso is closer to Locke’s originally intended meaning, and is more plausible in itself. Finally, I attempt to resolve another issue which could be raised as an objection to Nozick’s entitlement theory—that “ownership” is indeterminate—by proposing an alternative approach which rejects the endeavour to devise an account of the essential concept of ownership.