The deflationary view of information reloaded: communication and manipulability

Abstract

Timpson’s deflationary view of information is an innovative and well articulated view that had a great impact on the philosophy of physics community. However, recently some of the arguments supporting the deflationist view have been critically reviewed. The aim of this paper is to retain the general idea behind Timpson’s proposal, but replacing the conflictive elements used to support his thesis with new argumentative resources based on the notion of manipulability.

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Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.

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