76 found
Sort by:
  1. Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob (forthcoming). Making Sense of Early False-Belief Understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Pierre Jacob (forthcoming). Can Semantic Properties Be Non-Causal? Philosophical Issues.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Pierre Jacob (forthcoming). Patterns, causalité mentale et Lois intentionnelles. Les Etudes Philosophiques.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (forthcoming). Quand voir, c'est faire. Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Marine Buon, Pierre Jacob, Elsa Loissel & Emmanuel Dupoux (2013). A Non-Mentalistic Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social Evaluations. Cognition 126 (2):149-155.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Pierre Jacob (2013). How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Pierre Jacob (2012). Embodying the Mind by Extending It. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
    To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark ( 2008a ) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Pierre Jacob (2012). Sharing and Ascribing Goals. Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Pierre Jacob, Cova Florian & Dupoux Emmanuel (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Pierre Jacob (2011). Meaning, Intentionality and Communication. In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner (eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning. De Gruyter Mouton. 11--25.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Pierre Jacob (2011). The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
    This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2010). Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335.
    We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Pierre Jacob & Frédérique de Vignemont (2010). Spatial Coordinates and Phenomenology in the Two-Visual Systems Model. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Pierre Jacob (2009). A Philosopher's Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):570-595.
    Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent's perceived movements onto her own motor repertoire. Furthermore, ever since Gallese and Goldman's (1998) influential paper, action-mirroring has been linked to third-person mindreading on the grounds that it enables an observer to represent the agent's (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Pierre Jacob (2008). 'Mirror Neurons' Or'concept Neurons'? Mind and Language 23 (2):190-223.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Pierre Jacob (2008). What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition? Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Pierre Jacob (2007). Précis de L'Intentionnalité, problèmes de philosophie de l'esprit. Philosophiques 34 (1):153-158.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Pierre Jacob (2007). Réponses à Mes Critiques. Philosophiques 34 (1):173-181.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pierre Jacob (2007). Significado, normatividad y comunidad. In. In David P. Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos (eds.), Pluralidad de la Filosofía Analítica. Plaza y Valdés Editores. 321--342.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Pierre Jacob (2007). What is “Cognitive Accessibility” Accessibility To? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-508.
    I first argue that some of Block's formulations may misleadingly suggest that the function of mechanisms of so-called cognitive accessibility is to make one aware, not of visible features of the visible world, but of one's own psychological life. I then ask whether Block's view of phenomenology in the present target article is consistent with his endorsement of non-representationalism elsewhere.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Pierre Jacob & Emmanuel Dupoux (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (9):373-378.
    A new framework for the study of the human moral faculty is currently receiving much attention: the so-called ‘universal moral grammar' framework. It is based on an intriguing analogy, first pointed out by Rawls, between the study of the human moral sense and Chomsky's research program into the human language faculty. In order to assess UMG, we ask: is moral competence modular? Does it have an underlying hierarchical grammatical structure? Does moral diversity rest on culture-dependent parameters? We review evidence that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2007). Precis of Ways of Seeing. Dialogue 46 (2):335-340.
    This is a summary of the book Ways of Seing co-authord witth Marc Jeannerod and published by Oxford University Press in 2003.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2007). Reply to Our Critics. Dialogue 46 (2):361-368.
    Marc Jeannerod and I wrote a Précis of our 2003 book Ways of Seeing. The journal Dialogue asked Tim Schroeder, Alva Noë, Pierre Poirier and Martin Ratte to write a critical essay on our book. In this piece, we reply to our critics.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Pierre Jacob (2006). Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted. Psyche 12 (1).
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Pierre Jacob (2005). First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading. In P. Gampieri-Deutsch (ed.), Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science. Austrian Academy of Sciences.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and Perceiving Objects. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 241--283.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2005). Mental Simulation: A Hybrid Concept. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2005). The Motor Theory of Social Cognition: A Critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, many motor theorists of social (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
  33. Pierre Jacob, Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Pierre Jacob, Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Pierre Jacob (2003). Perceiving Objects and Grasping Them. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Pierre Jacob (2003). Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2003). Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition. OUP Oxford.
    Ways of seeing is a book about human vision. It results from the collaboration between a world famous cognitive neuroscientist and an eminent philosopher. In the past forty years, cognitive neuroscience has made many startling discoveries about the human brain, and about the human visual system in particular. This book brings many recent empirical findings, from electrophysiological recordings in animals, the neuropsychological examination of human patients, psychophysics, and developmental cognitive psychology, to bear on questions traditionally addressed by philosophers. What is (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Pierre Jacob (2002). Can Mental Content Explain Behavior? In Languages of the Brain.
  39. Pierre Jacob (2002). Languages of the Brain.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Pierre Jacob (2002). Review of Mark Rowlands' The Body in MInd (CUP, 1999). [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):325-331.
    I examine Mark Rowlands' book, 'The Body in Mind'.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Pierre Jacob (2002). Review of The Body in Mind, by Mark Rowlands. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):325-331.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Pierre Jacob (2002). Review: Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648 - 654.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Pierre Jacob, Seeing, Perceiving, and Knowing.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Pierre Jacob (2002). Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Pierre Jacob (2002). The Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
  46. Pierre Jacob (2001). Is Self-Knowledge Compatible with Externalism? Mind and Society 2 (1):59-75.
    Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being is able to know directly or non-inferentially, in a way unavailable to anybody else, what he or she thinks or experiences. Now, if what I think (or experience) is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Pierre Jacob (2001). What is the Difference Between a Deflationary and a Non-Deflationary Theory of Meaning? Acta Analytica 26:7-14.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Pierre Jacob (2000). Ce que pense un individu peut-il expliquer ce qu'il fait? Philosophiques 27 (1):115-138.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Pierre Jacob (2000). Can Selection Explain Content? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:91-102.
    There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 76