129 found
Order:
  1. Pierre Jacob (2011). The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
    This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  2. Pierre Jacob (2008). What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition? Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   62 citations  
  3.  11
    Pierre Jacob (2013). How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
  4. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2003). Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition. OUP Oxford.
    Ways of Seeing is a unique collaboration between an eminent philosopher and a world famous neuroscientist. It focuses on one of the most basic human functions - vision. What does it mean to 'see'. It brings together electrophysiological studies, neuropsychology, psychophysics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind. The first truly interdisciplinary book devoted to the topic of vision, it will make a valuable contribution to the field of cognitive science.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  5. Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  6.  75
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2005). The Motor Theory of Social Cognition: A Critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, many motor theorists of social (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  7. Pierre Jacob (2006). Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted. Psyche 12 (1).
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8.  44
    Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob (2014). Making Sense of Early False-Belief Understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):167-170.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9.  55
    Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  10. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  11.  84
    Pierre Jacob & Emmanuel Dupoux (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (9):373-378.
    A new framework for the study of the human moral faculty is currently receiving much attention: the so-called ‘universal moral grammar' framework. It is based on an intriguing analogy, first pointed out by Rawls, between the study of the human moral sense and Chomsky's research program into the human language faculty. In order to assess UMG, we ask: is moral competence modular? Does it have an underlying hierarchical grammatical structure? Does moral diversity rest on culture-dependent parameters? We review evidence that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  12.  21
    Marine Buon, Pierre Jacob, Elsa Loissel & Emmanuel Dupoux (2013). A Non-Mentalistic Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social Evaluations. Cognition 126 (2):149-155.
  13.  71
    Pierre Jacob (2009). A Philosopher's Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):570-595.
    Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent's perceived movements onto her own motor repertoire. Furthermore, ever since Gallese and Goldman's (1998) influential paper, action-mirroring has been linked to third-person mindreading on the grounds that it enables an observer to represent the agent's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14.  35
    Pierre Jacob (1997). What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. Cambridge University Press.
    Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  15. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2010). Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335.
    We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  14
    Guillaume Dezecache, Pierre Jacob & Julie Grèzes (2015). Emotional Contagion: Its Scope and Limits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (6):297-299.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Pierre Jacob (2012). Embodying the Mind by Extending It. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
    To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark ( 2008a ) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Pierre Jacob (1998). What is the Phenomenology of Thought? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):443-448.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  1
    Pierre Jacob & Frédérique De Vignemont, What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain?
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  56
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
    I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  21.  55
    Pierre Jacob (2003). Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  22.  16
    Pierre Jacob & Frédérique de Vignemont (2010). Spatial Coordinates and Phenomenology in the Two-Visual Systems Model. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Pierre Jacob (1997). Conceptual Competence and Inadequate Conceptions. Philosophical Issues 9:169-174.
    I discuss a proposal by Jim Higginbotham for distinguishing mastery of a concept and knowing a conception.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  34
    Pierre Jacob (2012). Sharing and Ascribing Goals. Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  79
    Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and Perceiving Objects. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 241--283.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  20
    Pierre Jacob (1987). Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions. Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  27. Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
    I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  52
    Pierre Jacob (1993). Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
  29. Pierre Jacob (2005). First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading. In P. Gampieri-Deutsch (ed.), Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science. Austrian Academy of Sciences
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  58
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Can Mental Content Explain Behavior? In Languages of the Brain.
    I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a componential view of behavior according to which an individual's physical movement is a component of his or her behavior.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  5
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod, Chapter 1 of Ways of Seeing: The Representational Theory of the Visual Mind.
    This is the first chapter of Ways of Seeing co-authored with Marc Jeannerod. We ague for a representational approach to the puzzles of both visual perception and visually-guided actions.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  9
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Review: Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648 - 654.
    I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  12
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2005). Mental Simulation: A Hybrid Concept. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  4
    Pierre Jacob (2007). What is “Cognitive Accessibility” Accessibility To? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-508.
    I first argue that some of Block's formulations may misleadingly suggest that the function of mechanisms of so-called cognitive accessibility is to make one aware, not of visible features of the visible world, but of one's own psychological life. I then ask whether Block's view of phenomenology in the present target article is consistent with his endorsement of non-representationalism elsewhere.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  13
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Review of Mark Rowlands' The Body in MInd (CUP, 1999). [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):325-331.
    I examine Mark Rowlands' book, 'The Body in Mind'.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  36
    Pierre Jacob (2002). The Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins
  37.  33
    Pierre Jacob (1992). Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (New Series):203-19.
    Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  15
    Pierre Jacob (1991). Are Mental Properties Causal Efficacious? Grazer Philosophische Studien 39:51-73.
    In respect of the question whether mental properties, i.e. contents of mental states, are causally relevant the distinction between type and token physikalism and externalism and their consequences concerning the problems of property dualism and content epiphenomenalism are sketched. Fodor's theory - a functionalist version of token physikalism - is presented and criticized. Distinguishing between naming a causally relevant property and quantifying over it a solution to the threat of epihenomenalism is suggested, and finally Davidson's Anomalous Monism is defended.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  67
    Pierre Jacob (2001). Is Self-Knowledge Compatible with Externalism? Mind and Society 2 (1):59-75.
    Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being is able to know directly or non-inferentially, in a way unavailable to anybody else, what he or she thinks or experiences. Now, if what I think (or experience) is (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  66
    Pierre Jacob (1994). Can Semantic Properties Be Non-Causal? Philosophical Issues 6:44-51.
    I discuss Jerry Fodor's atomic theory of the contents of concepts.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  66
    Pierre Jacob (1998). Can Selection Explain Content? In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Doc Ctr 91-102.
    There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  19
    Pierre Jacob, Cova Florian & Dupoux Emmanuel (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  47
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2007). Precis of Ways of Seeing. Dialogue 46 (2):335-340.
    This is a summary of the book Ways of Seing co-authord witth Marc Jeannerod and published by Oxford University Press in 2003.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  1
    Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob (2016). Solving the Puzzle About Early Belief‐Ascription. Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.
    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2007). Precis of Ways of Seeing, the Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition. Psyche 13.
    Human vision raises a number of puzzles. Among them are the puzzles of visual experience: how to provide a scientific understanding of the phenomenal character of the visual experiences of the shapes, textures, colors, orientations and motion of perceived objects? How can a purely subjective visual experience be the basis of so much objective knowledge of the world? Visually guided actions raise a different puzzle: how can actions directed towards a target be so accurate in the absence of the agent’s (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  57
    Pierre Jacob (1990). Externalism Revisited: Is There Such a Thing as Narrow Content? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
    First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  3
    Pierre Jacob, Chomsky, Cognitive Science, Naturalism and Internalism.
    I explore Chomsky's naturalistic stance in cognitive science, his internalism in semantics and his attitude towards evolutionary assumptions.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  3
    Pierre Jacob, The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique.
    This paper assesses the so-called "direct-perception" model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another's psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one's understanding of another's psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (forthcoming). Quand voir, c'est faire. Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  50
    Pierre Jacob, Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.
    This paper is about belief ascriptions and problems that arise for a Fregean theory.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 129