Abstract

This marvelous and insightful work on James’s philosophy of religion draws its interpretation principally from The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious Experience. In chapters 3 and 4, Suckiel shows that James affirms the primacy of religious experience in the analysis of religious belief, eschewing the traditional intellectual approach. She argues that James holds that religious experience cannot be dismissed offhand as noncognitive; it may in fact constitute a preconceptual knowledge of an objective divine entity. The many varieties of religious experience might, therefore, serve as empirical evidence to support the truth of religious belief. Suckiel is, of course, quick to add that there must be criteria to distinguish veridical from non-veridical religious experience. And in an extension of James’s argument, she contends that if religious experience does not provide conclusive empirical confirmation of religious belief, it at least renders the latter probable.